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Liberalization, Growth,
and Financial Crises:
Lessons from Mexico 
and the Developing World
By now there is widespread agreement that trade liberalization
enhances growth. No such agreement exists, however, on the growth-
enhancing effects of ﬁnancial liberalization, in large part because it is
associated with risky capital ﬂows, lending booms, and crises. The Mexi-
can experience is often considered a prime example of what can go wrong
with liberalization. Mexico liberalized its trade and ﬁnance and entered
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), yet despite these
reforms, Mexico’s growth performance has been unremarkable in com-
parison with that of its peers. A particularly worrisome development is
that, since 2000, there has been a slowdown in Mexico’s exports.
That financial liberalization is bad for growth because it leads to crises
is the wrong lesson to draw. Our empirical analysis shows that, in coun-
tries with severe credit market imperfections, financial liberalization
leads to more rapid growth, but also to a higher incidence of crises. In
fact, most of the fastest-growing countries of the developing world have
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 1experienced boom-bust cycles. We argue that liberalization leads to
faster growth because it eases financial constraints, but that this occurs
only if agents take on credit risk, which makes the economy fragile and
prone to crisis. An implication of our analysis is that the international
bank flows that follow financial liberalization and increase financial
fragility are an important component of a rapid-growth path.
We also ﬁnd that asymmetries between the tradables (T) and nontrad-
ables (N) sectors are key to understanding the links among liberalization
and growth, boom-bust cycles, and the Mexican experience. Asymmetric
sectoral responses to liberalization and crisis are the norm.
At ﬁrst glance, the experience of Mexico, a prominent liberalizer, chal-
lenges the argument that liberalization promotes growth. However, when
we compare Mexico against an international norm, we ﬁnd that the
growth in Mexico’s exports during the 1990s was outstanding. We also
ﬁnd that, although its pattern of boom and crisis is similar to that of the
average liberalizing country, Mexico’s credit crunch in the wake of its
crisis has been atypically severe and long-lasting. This credit crunch,
together with a lack of structural reform since 1995, has resulted in stag-
nation of the N-sector, generating bottlenecks that have contributed to
Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth performance and to the more recent fall
in exports.
To document these points, we analyze the empirical relationship
among liberalization, crises, and growth across the set of countries with
active ﬁnancial markets, and we characterize the typical boom-bust cycle.
To substantiate our interpretation of the data and to explain the Mexican
experience, we present a model that establishes a causal link from liberal-
ization to growth, and in which the same forces that lead to faster growth
also generate ﬁnancial fragility. The model leads us to divide our data set
into countries with high and intermediate degrees of contract enforceabil-
ity (which we call high-enforceability and medium-enforceability coun-
tries, or HECs and MECs, respectively). 
Our data analysis shows that, across MECs, trade liberalization has
typically been followed by ﬁnancial liberalization, which has led to ﬁnan-
cial fragility and to occasional crises. On average, however, both trade
liberalization and ﬁnancial liberalization have led to more rapid long-run
growth in GDP per capita across the set of countries with active ﬁnancial
markets. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that this positive link is not generated by a
few fast-growing countries that experienced no crisis. Instead, it is typi-
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gests that the same mechanism that links liberalization with growth in
MECs also generates, as a by-product, ﬁnancial fragility and occasional
crises. 
These facts do not contradict the negative link between growth and the
variance of several macroeconomic variables—the typical measure of
volatility in the literature. A high variance reﬂects not only the uneven
progress, or “bumpiness,” associated with occasional crises, but also
high-frequency shocks. Instead we measure the incidence of occasional
crises by the (negative) skewness of real credit growth. Our ﬁndings show
that fast-growing MECs tend to have negatively skewed credit growth
paths.
Our explanation for the links among liberalization, bumpiness, and
growth is based on the fact that countries like Mexico have severe con-
tract enforceability problems. Because liberalization has not been accom-
panied by judicial reform, these problems have persisted. The key point is
that these problems affect ﬁrms asymmetrically: whereas many T-sector
ﬁrms can overcome these problems by accessing international capital
markets, most N-sector ﬁrms cannot. Thus N-sector ﬁrms are ﬁnancially
constrained and depend on domestic bank credit. Using microlevel data
from the Mexican economic census and from ﬁrms listed on the stock
market, we document this asymmetry for the case of Mexico.
Trade liberalization increases GDP growth by promoting T-sector pro-
ductivity. Financial liberalization adds even more to GDP growth by
accelerating ﬁnancial deepening and thus increasing the investment of
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, most of which are in the N-sector. However,
the easing of ﬁnancial constraints is associated with the undertaking of
credit risk, which often takes the form of foreign currency–denominated
debt backed by N-sector output. Credit risk arises because ﬁnancial liber-
alization not only lifts restrictions that preclude risk taking, but also is
associated with explicit and implicit systemic bailout guarantees that
cover creditors against systemic crises.1 Not surprisingly, an important
share of capital inﬂows takes the form of risky bank ﬂows, and the econ-
omy as a whole experiences aggregate fragility and occasional crises.
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1. We distinguish two types of bailout guarantees: unconditional and systemic. The
former are granted whenever an individual borrower defaults, whereas the latter are granted
only if a critical mass of borrowers default. Throughout this paper we focus on systemic
guarantees.
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abundant and cheap inputs. Thus, as long as a crisis does not occur,
growth in a risky economy is more rapid than in a safe one. Of course,
financial fragility implies that a self-fulfilling crisis may occur. And,
during a crisis, GDP growth falls and typically turns negative. Crises
must be rare, however, in order to occur in equilibrium—otherwise
agents would not find it profitable to take on credit risk in the first place.
Thus average long-run growth may be faster along a risky path than
along a safe one. Our model follows this intuition to establish a causal
link from liberalization to GDP growth. This link is independent of the
nominal exchange rate regime.
The argument imposes restrictions on the behavior of credit and of the
N-to-T output ratio that help us identify the mechanism. First, credit
growth and the N-to-T output ratio should fall drastically in the wake of a
crisis, and because crises are infrequent, they should exhibit a negatively
skewed distribution. Second, during normal times the N-to-T output ratio
should vary with credit. Finally, the N-to-T output ratio should decrease
following trade liberalization and increase following ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion. We show that the bumpiness of credit growth and these asymmetric
sectoral responses are indeed an empirical regularity across MECs. We
are not aware of other theoretical arguments that relate the N-to-T output
ratio to liberalization, growth, and crises and that explain the empirical
regularities we have found.
As we noted previously, relative to its initial GDP, Mexico’s growth
has been decent but not stellar. However, when we control for bumpiness,
Mexico is an underperformer. Even in the period since liberalization, the
Mexican economy has grown 2 percentage points less per year than the
average for other countries with comparably risky paths. When we com-
pare Mexico’s boom-bust cycle with that of the typical MEC, we ﬁnd that
Mexico’s boom phase and subsequent crisis are typical; it is Mexico’s
response to the crisis that is the outlier. Relative to the typical MEC, Mex-
ico’s credit crunch was both more severe and more protracted. The credit-
to-GDP ratio in Mexico fell from 49 percent in 1994 to 18 percent in 2002.
This severe credit crunch is in contrast to the fast recovery of GDP
growth in the wake of the tequila crisis of 1994–95. GDP growth can
mask a sharp sectoral asymmetry between an impressive increase in
exports and a lagging N-sector. The N-to-T output ratio fell about ﬁve
times as much in Mexico as in the average MEC. Microlevel data reveal
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 4that the prolonged postcrisis credit crunch mainly affected the N-sector,
whereas the T-sector received a large share of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and was insulated from the credit crunch because it could access
international ﬁnancial markets and shift away from domestic bank credit.
Over the past eight years, tight domestic credit has limited investment and
growth in the ﬁnancially constrained N-sector, with the result that it is the
T-sector, in large part, that has enjoyed the beneﬁcial effects of liberaliza-
tion and NAFTA. 
Mexico’s persistent credit crunch is puzzling. It cannot be explained by
a fall in loanable funds: deposits have grown in parallel with GDP, and a
large share of the banking system (88 percent by 2001) has been sold to
foreigners. What accounts, then, for the credit crunch? Evidence suggests
that the fall in credit has been associated both with a sharp deterioration in
contract enforceability and with the policy response to the problem of
nonperforming bank loans.
Since 2001 Mexican exports and GDP have stopped growing. The
empirical evidence indicates that the U.S. recession can account for part
of this slowdown, but not all of it. Our conceptual framework points out
some internal factors that can help us account for this residual: ﬁre sales
and the bottleneck effect. In our model, access to international ﬁnancial
markets combined with a real depreciation allows the T-sector to buy
inputs at ﬁre-sale prices and thus to grow rapidly in the wake of the crisis.
However, this rosy scenario cannot go on forever. Lack of credit and of
structural reform depresses N-sector investment, and the resulting decline
in N-sector output generates bottlenecks that eventually block T-sector
growth. Does this prediction of the model apply to Mexico? Sectoral evi-
dence shows that the subsectors where exports have declined the most are
those that use N-sector inputs most intensively. Given the lackluster per-
formance of the N-sector, this suggests that bottlenecks are contributing
to the slowdown.
Consider next the question of the structure of capital flows. Although
several observers have advocated limiting bank flows and promoting
FDI as a way to reduce financial fragility, our framework makes it clear
that limiting bank flows may hinder growth. We document that the lion’s
share of FDI goes to the T-sector or to financial institutions and, more-
over, that the small share that goes to the N-sector is allocated to very
large firms. Thus most of the inflows that end up in the N-sector are
intermediated by domestic banks. In countries with severe contract
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N-sector at best, and at worst prevents it from growing for years. Thus
FDI is not a substitute for risky bank flows.
The ﬁndings of this paper do not imply that crises are a good thing.
They are the price that must be paid to attain rapid growth in the presence
of contract enforceability problems. The ﬁrst-best policy is to improve
domestic credit markets by implementing judicial reform. If this is not
feasible, liberalization will likely lead to ﬁnancial fragility, as risky bank
ﬂows become the only source of ﬁnance for a large group of ﬁrms. Such
ﬂows are necessary to avoid bottlenecks and ensure long-run growth.
The Mexican experience shows that long-run growth cannot be based
solely on export growth. Because the T-sector depends on N-sector
inputs, the N-sector must also grow in order for the economy to attain a
balanced and sustainable growth path. This requires adequate ﬁnancing
for domestically oriented ﬁrms. In the wake of a crisis, the economy can
attain spectacular export growth for a few years through a real deprecia-
tion and the T-sector’s use of inexpensive N-sector inputs. However, low
N-sector investment eventually generates bottlenecks, which block fur-
ther growth.
The link between liberalization and growth has generated controversy,
because some researchers have found no signiﬁcant positive link between
the two. This ﬁnding might be due either to the country sample being con-
sidered or to the use of openness indicators. The model we present shows
that the asymmetric sectoral responses and the links among liberalization,
bumpiness, and growth arise only if contract enforceability problems are
severe without being too severe. This underlies the importance of the
country sample one considers and leads us to focus on the set of countries
with functioning ﬁnancial markets. In order to analyze the effects of liber-
alization, we construct de facto indexes of trade and ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion that distinguish the year of liberalization. This allows us to compare
the behavior of several macroeconomic variables in both closed and open
country-years.
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections analyze the
links among liberalization, bumpiness, and growth. The third section ana-
lyzes Mexico’s performance. The fourth analyzes the structure of capital
ﬂows. The ﬁnal section presents some economic policy lessons and con-
cludes. Appendixes to the paper describe our model and the construction
of our variables.
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In this section we analyze empirically the links among liberalization,
ﬁnancial fragility, and growth across the set of countries with functioning
ﬁnancial markets. The mechanism described in the introduction operates
only in countries with a basic level of contract enforcement that permits
agents to attain high enough leverage and reap the beneﬁts of liberaliza-
tion. Thus we restrict our data set to countries where the ratio of stock
market turnover to GDP was greater than 1 percent in 1998. This set con-
sists of sixty-six countries, ﬁfty-two of which have data available for the
period 1980–99. Throughout the paper we partition this set into seventeen
HECs and thirty-ﬁve MECs. The former group includes the Group of
Seven large industrial countries and those countries in which the rule of
law index of Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton is
greater than 1.4.
2
To assess the effects of liberalization, we analyze several macro-
economic variables before and after dates of liberalization. To do this, we
construct two de facto indexes that signal the year during which an MEC
switches from closed to open. The trade liberalization index signals that a
country is open if its ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP exhibits
a trend break or is greater than 30 percent. The ﬁnancial liberalization
index signals an opening when the series of cumulative capital inﬂows
experiences a trend break or if they exceed 10 percent of GDP. The idea is
that a large change in a measure of openness indicates that a policy reform
has taken place and that the reform has had a signiﬁcant effect on actual
ﬂows.
As explained in more detail in appendix B, we identify the breakpoints
using the cumulative sum of residuals (CUSUM) method. In most cases
the opening dates identiﬁed by our indexes are similar to those identiﬁed
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2. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). The HECs are Australia, Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The MECs are Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador,
Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The
sample includes forty-one of the forty-four countries in the International Finance Corpora-
tion’s emerging markets database, the exceptions being Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Singa-
pore. Of these, the ﬁrst two do not satisfy the 1 percent stock market turnover criterion, and
for Singapore we do not have data.
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vey, and Christian Lundblad, the ﬁnancial liberalization index of Graciela
Kaminski and Sergio Schmukler, and the trade liberalization index of Jef-
frey Sachs and Andrew Warner.3
The country-years identiﬁed as liberalized by our indexes do not
always coincide with good economic times, during which capital is ﬂow-
ing in and the economy is booming. Liberalized country-years include
both boom and bust episodes. 
All the HECs in our sample have been open since 1980, which is the
beginning of our sample period. Figure 1 exhibits the shares of MECs in
our sample that have become open to trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. It shows
that in 1980 only 25 percent of these countries were open to trade. Most of
these countries started to liberalize in the mid-1980s, and 84 percent had
liberalized their trade by 1999. 
Several observers have suggested that, to avoid volatility, countries
should liberalize trade but not ﬁnancial ﬂows. Our ﬁrst stylized fact indi-
cates that this has typically not occurred.
Stylized fact 1. Over the last two decades trade liberalization has typi-
cally been followed by ﬁnancial liberalization. 
Our indexes show that, by 1999, 72 percent of countries that had liber-
alized trade had also liberalized ﬁnancial ﬂows, bringing the share of
MECs that are ﬁnancially liberalized from 25 percent in 1980 to 69 per-
cent. This close association suggests that an open trade regime is usually
sustained with an open ﬁnancial regime, because exporters and importers
need access to international ﬁnancial markets. Since capital is fungible, it
is difﬁcult to insulate the ﬁnancial ﬂows associated with trade transac-
tions. A few exceptions such as India, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela have lib-
eralized trade but have not liberalized their ﬁnancial markets.
The hypothesis that trade liberalization leads to ﬁnancial liberalization
can be tested with Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis that trade
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
3. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001); Kaminski and Schmukler (2002); Sachs and
Warner (1995). Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad focus on stock market liberalization,
which, although highly correlated with, is distinct from ﬁnancial or capital account liberal-
ization. Listed ﬁrms are a privileged set. Stock market liberalization gives them even more
opportunities but does not by itself relax the credit constraints on all other ﬁrms. Our argu-
ment is that ﬁnancial liberalization promotes growth because it eases the borrowing con-
straints faced by the latter set of ﬁrms. Kaminski and Schmukler’s (2002) index of ﬁnancial
liberalization covers only a small subset of countries.
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F statistic of 3.671, which corresponds to a p value of 0.05. By contrast,
the null hypothesis that ﬁnancial liberalization does not lead to trade lib-
eralization cannot be rejected, with an F statistic of only 0.018, which
corresponds to a p value of 0.98.
Liberalization and GDP Growth
Here we show that, across the set of countries with functioning ﬁnan-
cial markets, both trade and ﬁnancial liberalization have been, on average,
good for growth. This result conﬁrms similar links established in the liter-
ature. In the next two subsections we address the point, made by several
observers, that liberalization might not be growth enhancing because it
leads to crises. We will show that, indeed, ﬁnancial liberalization has typ-
ically been followed by booms and busts, but also that ﬁnancial fragility
has been associated with faster GDP growth in spite of the fact that it
leads to crises.
In this section we will not say anything about causality. Appendix A
presents a model that shows that, in the presence of credit market imper-
fections, liberalization leads to faster growth because it allows ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms to undertake credit risk, which both eases borrowing
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Figure 1. Countries with Liberalized Trade and Financial Flows, 1980–99a
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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The model establishes a causal link from liberalization to growth and has
testable implications, which we will use to identify the mechanism in the
next section.
Figure 2 shows that ﬁnancial liberalization is associated with faster
GDP growth. The ﬁgure depicts GDP growth rates in MECs before and
after ﬁnancial liberalization, after controlling for initial income per capita
and population growth.4 This simple graphical representation reveals two
patterns: ﬁrst, growth is on average more rapid in open country episodes
than in closed;5 second, in almost every country the open episode exhibits
more rapid growth than the closed episode.6
In order to assess the link between liberalization and growth, we add
our liberalization variables to a standard growth regression:
where ∆yit is the average growth rate of GDP per capita; yi,ini is the initial
level of GDP per capita; Xit is a vector of control variables that includes
initial human capital, the average population growth rate, and life
expectancy; and TLit and FLit are our trade and ﬁnancial liberalization
indicators, respectively. We do not include investment among the control
variables, because we expect trade and ﬁnancial liberalization to affect
GDP growth through higher investment.
We estimate the regression in three different ways. First, we estimate a
standard cross-sectional regression by ordinary least squares. In this case
1980 is the initial year. TLit and FLit take values between 0 and 1, specify-
ing the share of years that the country was liberalized during our sample
period {0, 0.05, 0.1, . . . , 1}. Second, we estimate a panel regression using
two nonoverlapping windows of time: 1980–89 and 1990–99. Here the
liberalization variables again take a value between 0 and 1 during each
() , 1 12 ∆yy XT L F L it i it it it jt =+ + + + λγ φ φ ε ini
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4. Only one growth rate is shown for countries that were open or closed throughout the
period. Country episodes of less than ﬁve years are excluded.
5. Exceptions are China, which performed better than predicted in spite of being
closed, and Greece, which is an underperforming open economy.
6. Here an exception is Indonesia, which grew marginally less rapidly during the open
period. However, given Indonesia’s major crisis in the postliberalization period, the fact
that it recorded a growth rate above the predicted value in the second period is still remark-
able. Note that even in cases (such as Brazil and the Philippines) where the growth rate is
less than predicted, the gap between the actual and the predicted value is smaller in the
open period.
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 10Figure 2. Estimated Annual Growth Rate of GDP per Capita 
before and after Financial Liberalization, 1980–99a
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
a. The country episodes are constructed using windows of different lengths for each country. Country episodes shorter than ﬁve
years are excluded. Averaging over these periods, a simple growth regression is estimated by ordinary least squares in which real
GDP growth per capita is the dependent variable and the country’s initial income and population growth are the only independent
variables. The ﬁgure plots the residuals from this regression.






































1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 11subperiod. Last, we use overlapping time windows. For each country and
each variable, we construct ten-year averages starting with the period
1980–89 and rolling forward to the period 1990–99. Thus each country
has up to ten data points in the time-series dimension. In this case the lib-
eralization variables take values in the interval [0,1], depending on the
proportion of liberalized years in a given window. We estimate the panel
regressions using generalized least squares. We deal with the resulting
autocorrelation in the residuals by adjusting the standard errors according
to the method of Whitney Newey and Kenneth West.7
Table 1 reports the estimation results. The ﬁnancial liberalization vari-
able enters signiﬁcantly at the 5 percent level in all regressions in which it
appears. The cross-sectional regression (column 1-1) shows that, follow-
ing ﬁnancial liberalization, growth in GDP per capita increases by
2.4 percentage points a year, after controlling for the standard variables.
The corresponding estimates are 1.7 percentage points in the nonover-
lapping panel regression (column 1-2) and 2.5 percentage points in the
overlapping-windows regression (column 1-3). The last regression is sim-
ilar to those estimated by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad using stock
market liberalization dates. They ﬁnd that GDP growth increases in the
range of 0.4 to 1.5 percentage points.
Column 1-4 in table 1 shows that, following trade liberalization, GDP
growth increases 1.8 percentage points a year. This estimate is similar to
the 2-percentage-point increase found by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew
Warner.8 Notice that the increase in GDP growth is greater following
ﬁnancial liberalization than following trade liberalization. Moreover, col-
umn 1-5 shows that when we include both variables in the growth regres-
sion, the marginal effect of trade liberalization falls to 1.6 percentage
points, whereas that of ﬁnancial liberalization increases (to 2.8 percentage
points). These ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial liberalization has growth-
enhancing effects, in addition to the productivity gains from trade liberal-
ization. The effect of ﬁnancial liberalization will be the focus of the
model we present in appendix A. Finally, column 1-6 shows that the pos-
itive link between liberalization and growth is also evident in the larger
sample that includes HECs as well as MECs. 
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7. Newey and West (1987). Our panel is unbalanced because not all series are available
for all periods. Our source of data is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
See appendix B for the speciﬁc sources.
8. Sachs and Warner (1995).
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 12To deal with the possible endogeneity of the liberalization variables,
table B3 in appendix B reports estimation results from two-stage least
squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin index of Rafael
La Porta and others,9 as well as lagged values of all the variables in the
regression. The table also reports results of regressions with ﬁxed effects
and of regressions excluding China and Ireland, which may be driven by
other factors. Our benchmark results in the ﬁrst three columns are robust
to these different estimation methods.
The following stylized fact summarizes our ﬁndings.
Stylized fact 2. Over the period 1980–99, both trade liberalization and
ﬁnancial liberalization are associated with more rapid growth in GDP
per capita across the set of countries with functioning ﬁnancial markets.
The existing literature provides mixed evidence on whether openness
promotes long-run growth.10 This can be attributed either to the indicators
Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza Martínez 13
9. La Porta and others (1999).
10. See, for instance, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001), Chari and Henry (2002),
Dollar and Kraay (2003), Edison and others (2002), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer
(1999), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003), Prasad and others (2003).
Table 1. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita 
with Trade and Financial Liberalizationa
Independent variable 1-1b 1-2c 1-3d 1-4d 1-5d 1-6e
Financial 2.363** 1.691** 2.502** 2.777** 2.278**
liberalization (0.533) (0.603) (0.101) (0.115) (0.172)
Trade liberalization 1.784** 1.606** 0.147**
(0.155) (0.105) (0.021)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2f 0.546 0.633 0.692 0.544 0.747 0.802
No. of observations 34 59 290 300 280 440
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The estimated equation is equation 1 in the text; the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita. Control variables include initial income per capita, secondary schooling, population growth, and life expectancy. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity according to Newey and West (1987). ** indicates sig-
niﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. Standard cross-sectional regression estimated by ordinary least squares for the period 1980–99.
c. Nonoverlapping panel regression estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) with two periods, 1980–89 and 1990–99.
d. Overlapping panel regression estimated by GLS with data as ten-year averages starting with 1980–89 and rolling forward to
1990–99.
e. Same as column 1-5 but with the addition of high-enforceability countries.
f. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables because of the
overlapping nature of the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the standard errors exists for adjust-
ing the R
2, and therefore the values need to be interpreted carefully.
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signiﬁcant link for two reasons. First, we identify liberalization dates that
allow us to compare performance during liberalized country-years with
that during nonliberalized ones. Second, we restrict our analysis to the set
of countries that have functioning ﬁnancial markets, because only in these
countries do we expect our mechanism to work.
In contrast, many papers that do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant link use de jure
liberalization indexes or de facto indexes that do not identify liberaliza-
tion dates. However, the de jure indexes currently available for a large set
of countries do not accurately reﬂect countries’ de facto access to interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets. A country that has liberalized de jure may not
implement the new policy for many years or may simply lack access to
international ﬁnancial markets despite having liberalized. For example,
some African countries are de jure more ﬁnancially liberalized than most
Latin American countries yet have much smaller international ﬁnancial
ﬂows. Several de facto “openness indexes” measure the size of some cap-
ital ﬂow categories over the sample period. But because these openness
indexes do not identify a speciﬁc year of liberalization, they are not
appropriate for comparing the behavior of macroeconomic variables
before and after liberalization.
Liberalization and Financial Fragility
We have shown that both trade and ﬁnancial liberalization are associ-
ated with faster long-run growth across countries with functioning ﬁnan-
cial markets. Financial liberalization has often been criticized on the
grounds that it leads to crises, which are bad for growth. This argument is
neither empirically nor conceptually correct: that ﬁnancial liberalization
leads to infrequent crises does not mean that ﬁnancial liberalization is bad
for growth over the long run. We will show that ﬁnancial liberalization
does indeed lead to a greater incidence of crisis. Then we will show that
the average positive link between liberalization and growth documented
above is not driven by those rapid-growth countries that have had no
crises. Instead, countries that grow faster tend to have crises. That is, there
is a strong statistical link between the incidence of crises and long-run
growth. This ﬁnding does not imply that crises are good for (or cause)
growth. 
14 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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of severe credit market imperfections, the forces that generate ﬁnancial
deepening and growth also generate—as a by-product—ﬁnancial fra-
gility. Because ﬁnancial liberalization generates both ﬁnancial deepening
and crises, any analysis of the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization must
weigh its beneﬁts against its costs. In short, it would be a mistake to reject
ﬁnancial liberalization by focusing only on its costs and its tendency to
lead to crises.
To address systematically the issues discussed above, we need a mea-
sure of ﬁnancial fragility. Unfortunately, no existing indexes of ﬁnancial
fragility are comparable across countries. In keeping with the spirit of this
paper, we use instead a de facto measure of fragility: negative skewness
of credit growth. That is, we capture the existence of fragility by one of its
symptoms: infrequent, sharp, and abrupt falls in credit growth. These
abrupt falls occur during the banking crises that are characteristic of the
boom-bust cycles that typically follow ﬁnancial liberalization. During the
boom, bank credit expands very rapidly and excessive credit risk is under-
taken. As a result, the economy becomes ﬁnancially fragile and prone to
crisis. Although the likelihood that a lending boom will crash in a given
year is low, many lending booms do eventually end in a crisis.11 During
such a crisis, new credit falls abruptly and recuperates only gradually.
It follows that a country that experiences a boom-bust cycle exhibits
rapid credit growth during the boom, a sharp and abrupt fall during the
crisis, and slow credit growth during the credit crunch that develops in the
wake of the crisis. Since credit does not jump during the boom, and crises
happen only occasionally, in ﬁnancially fragile countries the distribution
of credit growth rates is characterized by negative outliers. In statistical
terms, countries that experience boom-bust cycles exhibit a negatively
skewed distribution of credit growth. In plain language, the path of credit
growth is “bumpy.”12
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11. On the link between lending booms and crises, see Gourinchas, Landerretche, and
Valdés (2001), Kaminski and Reinhart (1999), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a), and
Tornell and Westermann (2002). See Bordo and Eichengreen (2002) for a historical
perspective.
12. During a lending boom a country experiences positive growth rates that are above
normal. However, these are not positive outliers because the lending boom takes place for
several years, and so most of the distribution is centered around a very high mean. Only a 
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be an ideal measure of ﬁnancial fragility. But in a ﬁnite sample the index
may overlook some cases of fragility that do not—yet—reﬂect bumpi-
ness. Because most MECs that have followed risky credit paths experi-
enced at least one major crisis during our sample period (1980–99), we
ﬁnd that negative skewness of credit growth is a good indicator of the
riskiness of the credit path followed by a given country.
Figure 3 depicts the kernel distributions of credit growth rates for
India, Mexico, and Thailand.13 Credit growth in India, a typical example
of a nonliberalized country, has a low mean, and the data are quite tightly
distributed around the mean, with skewness close to zero. Meanwhile
credit growth in Thailand, a prime example of a liberalized economy, has
a very asymmetric distribution and is characterized by negative skewness.
Mexico, like Thailand, has a very asymmetric distribution, and its mean is
closer to that of Thailand than to that of India. 
Table 2 shows that the link between ﬁnancial liberalization and bumpi-
ness holds more generally across MECs. The table partitions country-
years into two groups: years before ﬁnancial liberalization and years after.
The table shows that ﬁnancial liberalization leads to an increase in the
mean of credit growth of 4 percentage points (from 3.8 percent to 7.8 per-
cent) and a fall in the skewness of credit growth from near zero to –1.08,
and has only a negligible effect on the variance of credit growth. This
illustrates the following stylized fact.
Stylized fact 3. Across MECs ﬁnancial liberalization has been followed
by ﬁnancial deepening. This process, however, has not been smooth but is
characterized by booms and occasional busts.
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
positive one-period jump in credit would create a positive outlier in growth rates and gen-
erate positive skewness. For instance, the increase in capital inﬂows that takes place when
a country liberalizes might generate such positive skewness.
13. The simplest nonparametric density estimate of a distribution of a series is the
histogram. A histogram, however, is sensitive to the choice of origin and is not continu-
ous. We therefore choose the more illustrative kernel density estimator, which smoothes
the bumps in the histogram (see Silverman, 1986). Smoothing is done by putting less
weight on observations that are further from the point being evaluated. The kernel func-
tion by Epanechnikov is given by (3/4)[1 – (∆B)2]I(|∆B|≤1), where ∆B is the growth rate
of real credit and I is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if |∆B| ≤ 1 and zero
otherwise.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Credit Growth in India, Mexico, and Thailand, 1988–99a
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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and both the mean and the variance are smaller than across MECs. As we
will argue below, this difference reﬂects the absence of severe credit mar-
ket imperfections in HECs.
The effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on the mean and the bumpiness of
credit growth is represented visually in the event study in ﬁgure 4. The top
panel shows the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio, after liberalization,
from its mean in normal times (that is, the years not covered by the
dummy variables in the regression). Over the six years following the lib-
eralization date, the credit-to-GDP ratio increases on average by 6 per-
centage points, and this cumulative increase is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. The bottom panel shows the increase in negative skewness, which
reﬂects the increase in bumpiness.14 Here the average negative skewness
increases from about zero to –2.5, which is also signiﬁcant at the 5 per-
cent level.
In the literature, variance is the typical measure of volatility. We
choose not to use variance to identify growth-enhancing credit risk
because a high variance of credit growth reﬂects not only the presence of
boom-bust cycles, but also the presence of high-frequency shocks. This
may lead to false inferences about the links among liberalization,
fragility, and growth. In the sample we consider, this problem is particu-
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
14. Skewness is computed over a ten-year period. Since the event window is based on
only ten data points, we consider a shorter window.









Standard deviation 0.045 …
Skewness 0.497 …
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The sample is partitioned into two country-year groups: liberalized and nonliberalized. Before the standard deviation and
skewness are calculated, the means are removed from the series and data errors for Belgium, New Zealand, and the United King-
dom are corrected for.
b. High contract enforceability countries were liberalized throughout the period.
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Figure 4. Deviation of Credit-to-GDP Ratio and Skewness 
of Credit Growth Following Liberalizationa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Shaded lines represent 95 percent conﬁdence intervals around the estimates. The event windows were constructed from panel
regressions of the respective variable on dummy variables that take the value of 1 in periods when a country liberalized and zero
otherwise. The panel regressions are estimated with ﬁxed effects, using a generalized least squares estimator.
b. Deviation of credit-to-GDP ratio from its preliberalization mean.
















Skewness of credit growth
c
Years before and after liberalization
larly acute because high-frequency shocks are more abundant than the
rare crises that punctuate lending booms.
In short, variance is not a good measure for distinguishing economies
that have followed risky, growth-enhancing credit paths from those that
have experienced high-frequency shocks. By contrast, negative skewness
of credit growth is a good indicator of the incidence of occasional crises.
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skewness because it is a parsimonious way to capture the existence of
risky credit paths. Furthermore, it complements the variance in the regres-
sions we estimate by allowing us to distinguish between “good” volatility
(bumpiness) and “bad” volatility (variance).15
Financial Fragility and Growth
We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, which in turn leads not only to ﬁnancial deepening but
also to booms and busts. On the one hand, in an economy with severe
credit market imperfections, ﬁnancial deepening is good for growth
because ﬁnancing constraints are eased. On the other hand, crises are bad
for growth because they generate systemic insolvencies and ﬁre sales.
Ultimately, which of these two effects dominates is an empirical question.
The following stylized fact summarizes the results that will be discussed
below.
Stylized fact 4. Over the last two decades, countries with bumpy credit
paths have grown faster than those with smooth credit paths, when the
standard variables are controlled for.
Our results are foreshadowed by ﬁgure 5, which shows the link
between GDP growth and the moments of credit growth across MECs,
controlling for initial GDP and population growth. Rapid long-run GDP
20 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
15. Skewness is sufﬁcient to identify a risky path. High kurtosis may come on top of it,
but it is neither necessary nor sufﬁcient. The combination of the two is sufﬁcient but identi-
ﬁes the extreme cases only. For instance, it does not capture many countries that have expe-
rienced boom-bust cycles (such as Chile, Mexico, and Turkey). Kurtosis could in principle
provide further information about the distribution. However, in practice it is not useful in
identifying the risky and the safe paths. If there is a single, short-lived crisis, an outlier in the
distribution leads to a long tail on the left and a high kurtosis. However, if there is auto-
correlation in the growth rates and the crisis is somewhat persistent, or if there is more than
one crisis, the distribution becomes bimodal, and kurtosis can easily become very low. It is
therefore an excessively sensitive measure of bumpiness. Depending on the degree of auto-
correlation in the shocks, it could be anything from one to inﬁnity (the kurtosis of a normal
distribution is equal to 3). In principle, one could argue that other low-frequency shocks
affect both safe and risky economies. Therefore skewness could pick up countries that did
not undertake credit risk but had exogenous negative low-frequency shocks that led to a neg-
atively skewed distribution. We are not aware that such shocks have hit MECs during the
last two decades. Veldkamp (2002) has used skewness to analyze asset price crashes.
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Figure 5. Correlation of Average GDP Growth with Moments 
of Credit Growth Distribution, 1988–99
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 21growth is associated with a higher mean growth rate of credit, lower vari-
ance, and negative skewness.
As the ﬁgure shows, countries that have followed a risky path, such as
Chile, Korea, and Thailand, exhibit negatively skewed credit growth and
rapid GDP growth. In contrast, countries that have followed a safe path do
not exhibit negative skewness and have slow growth; examples are
Bangladesh, Morocco, and Pakistan. China and Ireland are notable excep-
tions: they have experienced very rapid GDP growth in the last twenty
years but have not experienced a major crisis despite a high rate of credit
growth.
In order to assess the link between bumpiness and growth, we add the
three moments of real credit growth to the regression in equation 1:
where ∆yit, yi,ini, Xit, TLit, and FLit are deﬁned as in equation 1, and µ∆B,it,
σ∆B,it, and S∆B,it are the mean, standard deviation, and skewness of the real
credit growth rate, respectively. We do not include investment as a con-
trol variable because we expect the three moments of credit growth, our
variables of interest, to affect GDP growth through higher investment.
We estimate equation 2 using the same type of overlapping panel data
regression as for equation 1. For each moment of credit growth and each
country, we construct ten-year averages starting with the period 1980–89
and rolling forward to the period 1990–99. Similarly, the liberalization
variables take values in the interval [0,1], depending on the proportion of
liberalized years in a given window.16 Given the dimension of equation 2,
the overlapping-windows regression is the most appropriate method for
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16. Since the higher moments of credit growth cannot be computed in a meaningful
way when the observations are few, we consider only series for which we have at least ten
years of data.
17. The overlapping-windows regression captures the spirit of the model we present
below for the following reason. In the risky equilibrium of a liberalized economy there is a
probability 1 – u that a crisis will occur at time t + 1, given that a crisis does not occur at t.
Meanwhile, in a nonliberalized economy, the probability of a crisis is always zero. There-
fore, according to the model, ten-year windows with more liberalized years should exhibit
both greater negative skewness and more rapid growth than windows with fewer liberalized
years.
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ﬁnd that, after controlling for the standard variables, the mean growth rate
of credit has a positive effect on long-run GDP growth, and the variance
of credit growth has a negative effect. Both variables enter signiﬁcantly at
the 5 percent level in all regressions.18
The ﬁrst key point established in table 3 is that the credit that accom-
panies rapid GDP growth is bumpy. Columns 3-1 and 3-2 show that
bumpy credit markets are associated with higher growth rates across
countries with functioning ﬁnancial markets. That is, negative skew-
ness—a bumpier growth path—is on average associated with faster GDP
growth. This estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.19
To interpret the estimate of 0.27 for bumpiness, consider India, which
has near-zero skewness, and Thailand, which has a skewness of –2. A
point estimate of 0.27 implies that an increase in the bumpiness index of 2
(from zero to –2) increases the average long-run GDP growth rate by
0.54 percentage point a year. Is this estimate economically meaningful?
To address this question, note that, after controlling for the standard vari-
ables, Thailand grows about 2 percentage points faster per year than
India. Thus about a quarter of this growth differential can be attributed to
credit risk taking, as measured by the skewness of credit growth. 
One can interpret the negative coefﬁcient on variance as capturing the
effect of “bad” volatility generated by, for instance, procyclical ﬁscal pol-
icy.20 Meanwhile the positive coefﬁcient on bumpiness captures the
“good” volatility associated with the type of risk taking that eases ﬁnan-
cial constraints and increases investment. Notice that a country with high
variance need not have negative skewness.21
The second key point is that the association between bumpiness and
growth does not imply that crises are good for growth. Crises are costly.
They are the price that has to be paid in order to attain faster growth in the
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18. The link between ﬁnancial deepening and growth is well established in the litera-
ture. See, for instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000). See also the seminal work of McKinnon (1973). Robustness tests of the ﬁndings in
table 3 are presented in table B3.
19. Notice that the estimated coefﬁcient on bumpiness is not capturing country ﬁxed
effects. Recall that, for each country, skewness varies over time, like all other variables, as
we use ten-year rolling averages.
20. Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2002) show that ﬁscal policy-
induced volatility is bad for economic growth.
21. Imbs’s (2002) results are consistent with this view.
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in table 3. When the ﬁnancial liberalization indicator is included in the
growth regression, bumpiness enters with a negative sign (and is signiﬁ-
cant at the 10 percent level). In the MEC set, given that there is ﬁnancial
liberalization, the lower the incidence of crises, the better. We can see the
same pattern in the sample that includes HECs as well as MECs: the point
estimate of bumpiness in column 3-4 is lower than that in column 3-2.22
Clearly, liberalization without fragility is best, but the data suggest that
this combination is not available to MECs. Instead, the existence of con-
tract enforceability problems implies that liberalization leads to faster
growth because it eases ﬁnancial constraints but, as a by-product, also
induces ﬁnancial fragility. Despite the rare occurrence of crises, on net,
ﬁnancial liberalization has led to more rapid long-run growth, as shown
by the estimates in tables 1 and 3.
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22. The reason why bumpiness enters with a positive sign in the fourth column is that
all HECs are liberalized and have near-zero skewness. Thus negative skewness acts like a
dummy that selects MECs that have liberalized ﬁnancially.
Table 3. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita 
with Moments of Credit Growtha
Independent variable 3-1b 3-2c 3-3b 3-4c
Mean of real credit growth rate 0.170** 0.154** 0.093** 0.110**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Standard deviation of real credit  –0.029** –0.030** –0.014** –0.019**
growth rate (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Negative skewness of real credit  0.174** 0.266** –0.095* 0.135**
growth rate (0.069) (0.021) (0.053) (0.031)
Financial liberalization 1.894** 1.811**
(0.122) (0.163)
Trade liberalization 0.838** 0.895**
(0.155) (0.198)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 d 0.667 0.629 0.752 0.731
No. of observations 269 424 253 408
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Equation 2 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the average
annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
according to Newey and West (1987). Control variables include initial income per capita, secondary schooling, population
growth, and life expectancy. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. Sample includes MECs only.
c. Sample includes HECs and MECs.
d. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables because of the
overlapping nature of the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the standard errors exists for adjust-
ing the R
2, and therefore the values need to be interpreted carefully.
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table B3 in appendix B reports estimation results from two-stage least
squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin index of Rafael
La Porta and others, as well as lagged values of all the variables in the
regression in column 3-2. Table B3 also reports results of regressions
with ﬁxed effects and of regressions excluding China and Ireland, which
may be driven by other factors. The results in column 3-2 are robust to
these different estimation methods.
Identifying the Mechanism: Sectoral Asymmetries 
and the Boom-Bust Cycle
We have documented statistically signiﬁcant correlations between lib-
eralization and growth; among liberalization, ﬁnancial deepening, and
bumpiness; and between the latter two and growth. But what mechanism
underlies these links? Which way does the causation run?
Appendix A presents a model that establishes a causal link from liber-
alization to ﬁnancial deepening and GDP growth. Furthermore, the same
forces that generate growth also generate ﬁnancial fragility, which leads
to rare crises. The theoretical mechanism has unambiguous implications
for the behavior of credit and the ratio of N-sector to T-sector output.
Testing whether these predictions are conﬁrmed by the data will help
identify the direction of causation.
We start by describing the model intuitively. We then explain how the
model accounts for the main features of the typical boom-bust cycle expe-
rienced by MECs, and after that we test the predictions of the model
regarding the N-to-T output ratio. Finally, we discuss why the evidence
strongly supports the view that causation goes from liberalization to
growth and not the other way around.
The Mechanism
We consider a two-sector economy in which there are asymmetries in
ﬁnancing opportunities across sectors. T-sector ﬁrms have perfect access
to international capital markets. Meanwhile, N-sector ﬁnancing is subject
to two credit market imperfections: contract enforceability problems and
systemic bailout guarantees.
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cannot commit to repaying debt: they are able to divert funds to them-
selves by incurring a cost. As a result, in the model, lenders impose on
each N-sector firm a borrowing constraint that is proportional to its cash
flow. This setup captures the fact that, across MECs, T-sector firms can,
in general, access international capital markets more easily than most
N-sector firms. The latter are financially constrained and dependent on
domestic bank credit (except for the largest firms, which are in telecom-
munications, energy, and finance).23 Since trade and financial liberali-
zation have typically not been accompanied by judicial reform,
enforceability problems have remained. Thus liberalization has exacer-
bated the asymmetric financing opportunities across sectors.
The second imperfection found in MECs is that ﬁnancial liberalization
not only lifts restrictions that preclude risk taking but also is associated
with explicit and implicit bailout guarantees that protect creditors against
the effects of systemic crises. Because domestic banks have been the
prime beneﬁciaries of these guarantees, this has created incentives for
investors to use domestic banks to channel resources to ﬁrms that cannot
pledge international collateral. Thus liberalization has resulted in biased
capital inﬂows. T-sector ﬁrms and very large N-sector ﬁrms are the recip-
ients of FDI and portfolio ﬂows, whereas most of the inﬂows that end up
in the N-sector are intermediated through domestic banks, which enjoy
systemic bailout guarantees. 
A key result of the model is that systemic guarantees may induce banks
and their clients to take on credit risk, but they do not eliminate borrowing
constraints. Why does this happen? Systemic guarantees are promises to
step in and repay debt obligations only in case of widespread insolven-
cies. If there is systemic risk in the economy, agents can exploit the sub-
sidy implicit in the guarantees by undertaking credit risk. If a borrower
defaults in a state of the world where many other borrowers are also
defaulting, lenders will get repaid in full by the bailout agency. Because
the market anticipates this contingent subsidy, taking on credit risk
reduces the cost of capital. Thus borrowers will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to take
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23. There are several reasons why T-sector ﬁrms can access international ﬁnancial
markets more easily than N-sector ﬁrms. For instance, since T-sector ﬁrms tend to export,
they can more easily establish long-term relationships with foreign ﬁrms, and they can
pledge export receivables as collateral. Also, on average, T-sector ﬁrms are larger than
N-sector ﬁrms.
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time, guarantees do not neutralize enforceability problems, and thus bor-
rowing constraints are not eliminated. This is because a bailout is not
granted when only a few borrowers default.24
How is this systemic risk generated? Over the past few decades, credit
risk has become common in bank and corporate balance sheets in MECs
in the form of short maturities and currency mismatches. As a result, an
important share of banks’ liabilities is denominated in foreign currency,
whereas their assets either are denominated in domestic currency or are
loans to the N-sector. If a reversal of capital inﬂows were to occur, there
would be a real depreciation, ﬁre sales, and a meltdown of bank balance
sheets. It is in these circumstances that bailouts are generally granted. In
other words, the interaction of contract enforceability problems and sys-
temic bailout guarantees sets in motion a self-reinforcing mechanism. On
the one hand, the expectation of real exchange rate variability makes it
optimal for agents to denominate debt in foreign currency and run the risk
of going bankrupt. On the other hand, the resulting currency mismatch at
the aggregate level makes the real exchange rate variable, validating
agents’ expectations.25
We have seen that, in the presence of contract enforceability problems,
the credit of most N-sector ﬁrms is constrained by their cash ﬂow, even
though there are bailout guarantees. This happens because guarantees are
systemic, so that lenders will lend only as much as they are sure that the
borrower will be willing to repay. A second key observation is that taking
on credit risk reduces expected debt repayments because the bailout
agency will cover part of the debt obligation in the event of a systemic
crisis. Thus the bailout guarantee allows financially constrained firms to
borrow more than they could otherwise. This increase in borrowing and
investment is accompanied by an increase in credit risk. When many ﬁrms
take on credit risk, aggregate financial fragility rises, together with
N-sector investment and growth.
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24. This is why it is important to distinguish systemic from unconditional guarantees,
which are granted whenever there is an individual default. Notice that if all guarantees were
unconditional, enforceability problems would not generate borrowing constraints, because
a bailout would be granted whenever there is a single default, regardless of the state of the
world. The results in this paragraph are proved in Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming).
25. From a theoretical perspective, several other self-reinforcing mechanisms link
credit risk with aggregate ﬁnancial fragility. We focus on currency mismatches because
they capture the recent experience of MECs.
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goods are used in T-sector production. Therefore the T-sector will enjoy
more abundant and cheaper inputs than otherwise. As a result, as long as
a crisis does not occur, growth in a risky economy is faster than in a safe
one. This does not, however, guarantee that, in the long run, average
growth in a risky economy is also faster than in a safe one, because ﬁnan-
cial fragility implies that a self-fulﬁlling crisis may occur, in which case
GDP growth will fall.
As we show in appendix A, if crises are rare events, average long-run
growth will be faster along a risky path than along a safe path unless the
costs of a crisis are excessively high. In fact, if crises were not rare, agents
would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to take on credit risk in the ﬁrst place. This
explains why ﬁnancial fragility leads to faster mean GDP growth.
The argument has thus established a joint causal link: ﬁnancial liberal-
ization promotes both long-run growth and ﬁnancial fragility. Since, in
any equilibrium, crises both are rare and result in an abrupt and drastic
fall in credit, which recuperates only gradually, credit growth will be neg-
atively skewed if the time sample is long enough. Thus negative skewness
of credit growth is a symptom of ﬁnancial fragility. This explains why
skewness of credit growth is a valid right-hand-side variable in the regres-
sions we estimate.
Before moving on to the other predictions of the model, we emphasize
that both guarantees and enforceability problems are essential to the argu-
ment. If there were no guarantees, agents would not be willing to take on
credit risk to claim the implicit subsidy. Alternatively, if contract enforce-
ability problems were not severe enough, borrowing constraints would
not arise in equilibrium, and if enforceability problems were too severe,
ﬁrms could not attain enough leverage, and systemic risk would not arise.
To link these remarks to the data, we note that explicit and implicit sys-
temic bailout guarantees are present in most countries. They capture the
“too big to fail” principle: when a systemic meltdown occurs, govern-
ments tend to grant bailouts.26 The degree of contract enforceability varies
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
26. One might argue that, in the aftermath of crises, guarantees cease to exist tem-
porarily (for instance, because of ﬁscal constraints). However, after a few years they come
back. One might also argue that regulations precluding fraud or extreme risk taking might
be imposed as a result of a crisis. In terms of the model in appendix A, we would say that,
in that case, systemic guarantees are still in place, but either regulations do not allow agents
to exploit them or there is a shift in expectations in the wake of the crisis (that is, agents
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tract enforceability problems are not too severe as those where the stock
market turnover-to-GDP ratio was greater than 1 percent in 1998. We par-
tition this set into countries with either a high or a medium degree of
contract enforceability (HECs and MECs) as described earlier. The mech-
anism we have described is operative only in the MEC set.
The Boom-Bust Cycle and the Bottleneck Effect
In addition to helping us identify the mechanism that links liberaliza-
tion, fragility, and long-run growth, an attractive feature of our approach
is that it can account for higher-frequency phenomena, such as the
boom-bust cycles typically experienced by MECs, and the bottleneck
effect. This will allow us, in the next section, to evaluate the Mexican
performance.
We represent the typical boom-bust cycle by means of an event study.
Figure 6 shows the average behavior, across our set of thirty-ﬁve MECs,
of several macroeconomic variables around twin currency and banking
crises during the period 1980–99. Year 0 refers to the year during which
twin currency and banking crises take place.27 In each panel the heavy line
represents the average deviation relative to tranquil times, the dotted lines
represent the 95 percent conﬁdence interval, and the thin solid lines corre-
spond to Mexico.28
Typically, before a crisis there is a real appreciation and a lending
boom, during which credit grows unusually fast. During the crisis there
is a drastic real depreciation, which coincides with a meltdown of the
Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza Martínez 29
believe that others will not take on credit risk, and so a meltdown and hence a bailout can-
not take place in the next period).
27. We say that there is a twin crisis at year 0 if both a currency and a banking crisis
occur during that year, or if one occurs at year 0 and the other at year 1.
28. The graphs are the visual representations of the point estimates and standard errors
from regressions in which the variable depicted in the graph is the dependent variable,
regressed on time dummies preceding and following a crisis. We estimate the following
pooled regression: 
where y is the variable of interest in the graph; i = 1, . . . , 35 denotes the country; t = 1980,
. . . , 1999; and Dummyτ+j equals 1 at time τ+j and zero otherwise, where τ is a crisis year.
The panel data estimations account for differences in the mean by allowing for ﬁxed
effects, as well as for differences in the variance by using a generalized least squares esti-
mator, using the estimated cross-sectional residual variances.
ya it i j j it j =+ + + ∑ βε τ  Dummy ,
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 29Figure 6. Characteristics of the Boom-Bust Cycle in Mexico 
and in the Average Medium Contract Enforceability Countrya
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank, World Development Indicators; IMF, International Financial Sta-
tistics; National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics; and Banco de México.
a. Event windows are constructed from panel regressions of the variable in each graph on dummy variables that take on a value
of 1 in the period where a joint banking and currency crisis occurred and zero otherwise. The panel regressions are estimated with
ﬁxed effects, using a generalized least squares estimator. The N-to-T and GDP series were computed as midyear changes. The plots
are results from pooled regressions.
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 30banking system, widespread insolvencies, and fire sales. In the aftermath
of the crisis there is typically a short-lived recession and a fall in credit
that is both sharper and longer-lasting than the fall in GDP. Thus the
credit-to-GDP ratio declines. The milder fall in aggregate GDP than in
credit masks the asymmetric sectoral response we emphasize in this
paper: N-sector output falls more than T-sector output in the wake of a
crisis and recuperates more sluggishly thereafter. This asymmetry is also
present during the boom that precedes the crisis, as the N-sector grows
faster than the T-sector and a real appreciation occurs.29 Finally, the fig-
ure also shows that investment fluctuations are quite pronounced along
the boom-bust cycle, whereas those of consumption are not. 
The model can account for these features because ﬁnancial constraints
and credit risk (in the form of currency mismatches) coexist in equilib-
rium, and their interaction generates real exchange rate variability. In a
risky equilibrium, currency mismatch is optimal and borrowing con-
straints bind, so that there can be a self-fulﬁlling, steep real depreciation
that generates widespread bankruptcies of N-sector ﬁrms and the banks
that lend to them. Because N-sector net worth falls drastically and recu-
perates only gradually, there is a collapse in credit and N-sector invest-
ment, which take a long time to recuperate. Since T-sector ﬁrms do not
face ﬁnancial constraints, and the real depreciation allows them to buy
inputs at ﬁre-sale prices, this leads to rapid growth of T-sector output and
GDP in the wake of the crisis. As a result, the N-to-T output ratio falls
drastically and recuperates sluggishly.
However, rapid GDP growth cannot be sustained over a long period if it
is driven only by T-sector growth, because T-sector production needs
inputs from the N-sector. If the credit crunch continues for a long period,
depressed N-sector investment eventually leads to bottlenecks: the T-sector
no longer enjoys an abundant and cheap supply of N-sector inputs, and its
growth starts falling. This is the bottleneck effect, which implies that sus-
tainable growth cannot be supported only by export growth. This effect is
key to understanding Mexico’s recent performance.30
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29. This asymmetric sectoral response parallels the regressions using the N-to-T output
ratio in the previous subsection.
30. The fact that T-sector production uses N-sector inputs is key. This is an essential
difference between our model and the standard dependent-economy models, where the
linkage between the N- and the T-sectors derives from the fact that both use the same non-
reproducible factor. In such a model, rapid N-sector growth does not cause rapid T-sector
growth, and there is no bottleneck effect. In the short run, a shock that negatively affects
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We have shown that, in MECs, T-sector ﬁrms can in general access
international markets and overcome these problems more easily than
N-sector ﬁrms. This asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities imposes
restrictions on the behavior of credit and the response of the N-to-T out-
put ratio to various shocks. Testing whether these restrictions are present
in data from MECs will help us identify the mechanism that links liberal-
ization and long-run growth.
First, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to trade and
ﬁnancial liberalization. Since trade liberalization beneﬁts mostly T-sector
ﬁrms and allows them to establish ﬁnancing channels in international
markets, the N-to-T output ratio should decrease following trade liberal-
ization. Because ﬁnancial liberalization is typically followed by a lending
boom that beneﬁts the ﬁnancially constrained N-sector relatively more
than the T-sector, the N-to-T output ratio should increase following ﬁnan-
cial liberalization.
Second, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to a crisis. The
sharp real depreciation that occurs during crises worsens the balance
sheets of the N-sector ﬁrms and leads to ﬁre sales, which beneﬁt the
T-sector at the expense of the N-sector. Thus the N-to-T output ratio falls
in the wake of crises. Because N-sector credit is constrained by the sec-
tor’s net worth, and because it takes a long time for that net worth to
recover, the N-to-T output ratio might continue to fall for a prolonged
period.
Third, because the N-sector is more ﬁnancially constrained than the
T-sector, and banks are highly exposed to the N-sector, the N-to-T ratio
should move together with credit in normal times and should collapse
together with credit during crises.
To test whether these patterns are present in the data, we construct two
different indexes of N-sector and T-sector production for our set of coun-
tries. We then estimate regressions of the following form:
() / , , 3 12 3
0
5
∆NT c T L F L it it it it j i t j it
j
=+ + + + + +
= ∑ βββ δ ε credit crisis
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the N-sector’s investment and output generates a real depreciation and beneﬁts the T-sector
in both models. In the medium run the predictions of the two models differ. In our model
the T-sector will suffer a bottleneck as N-sector inputs become scarce. This is not the case
in the dependent-economy model.
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credit growth; TLit and FLit equal 1 if there has been trade or ﬁnancial lib-
eralization, respectively, in country i in or before year t, and zero other-
wise; and crisisi,t+j equals 1 in country i and year t + j, where t denotes the
year when twin banking and currency crises occur in country i, and j
denotes the number of years after the crisis.31
Our ﬁrst N-to-T output index is used in table 4. This index is con-
structed by looking at the behavior of the sectoral exports-to-GDP ratio.
We consider construction, manufacturing, and services, and for each
country we classify as the tradables sector the one of these three in which
this ratio is the highest, and as nontradables the one in which the ratio is
lowest. In appendix B we consider another index based on the variability
of the sectoral real exchange rate. The correlation between both indexes is
0.74, and the results of regressions using the two indexes are very similar. 
We estimate equation 3 using the MEC sample in a panel data regres-
sion that includes ﬁxed effects and uses a generalized least squares esti-
mator. The sample covers the period from 1980 to 1999 with annual data.
Column 4-1 in table 4 shows that, across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio
responds in the way predicted by the model. The liberalization variables
are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in all regressions. The estimates show
that the N-to-T output index falls following trade liberalization, whereas
it increases following ﬁnancial liberalization. The table also shows that
the N-to-T output index falls in the wake of a crisis. The strongest effect
is observed in the ﬁrst period after the eruption of the crisis. After a small
rebound in period t + 2, the index continues to fall until t + 4.
Consider now the link between bank credit and the N-to-T output
ratio. As column 4-2 of table 4 shows, credit growth enters with a posi-
tive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that the
co-movement of credit and the N-to-T output ratio is not conditional on
the occurrence of either a crisis or policy reform. To control for the fact
that the ratio can move in response to other shocks that generate move-
ments in the real exchange rate, we also estimate equation 3 including the
rate of real depreciation as an explanatory variable. As column 4-3 shows,
both liberalization variables and credit remain signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
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31. Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the sectors in the United States that use exter-
nal ﬁnance more intensively than others. They then test whether these same sectors have
grown faster in countries that have experienced greater ﬁnancial deepening.
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cantly at the 5 percent level in almost all cases.
An alternative way to examine the close link between the N-to-T out-
put ratio and credit growth is through vector autoregressions (VARs). If
we impose the restriction that output within a quarter is predetermined by
past investment, and thus does not respond to variations in credit, our
model implies that we can run bivariate VARs of credit with the N-to-T
output ratio, or of credit with GDP. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses
of the N-to-T output ratio and GDP to a 1-standard-deviation shock to real
credit growth in Mexico and the United States. The contrast is impressive.
In Mexico both GDP and the N-to-T output ratio react signiﬁcantly to a
credit shock even when the effects of crisis and liberalization are
accounted for.32
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
32. The crisis and liberalization dates have been dummied out in the VARs.
Table 4. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetriesa
Independent variable 4-1 4-2 4-3
Financial liberalization 1.147** 0.989** 1.007**
(0.140) (0.148) (0.141)




Rate of real depreciation 2.233**
(1.372)
Crisis year dummy –0.243* –0.205* –0.274**
(0.143) (0.125) (0.121)
Crisis year +1 –2.434** –2.124** –2.228**
(0.143) (0.184) (0.177)
Crisis year +2 0.193* 0.439** 0.370**
(0.127) (0.155) (0.147)
Crisis year +3 –0.793** –0.652** –0.693**
(0.127) (0.130) (0.122)
Crisis year +4 –0.499** –0.248 –0.348*
(0.192) (0.204) (0.194)
Crisis year +5 0.872** 0.837** 0.916**
(0.183) (0.162) (0.154)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.728 0.734
No. of observations 443 426 360
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the ratio of non-
tradables sector output to tradables sector output. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁcance at the
10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 7. Responses of Nontradable-to-Tradable Output Ratio and GDP to a One-
Standard-Deviation Positive Shock to Credit in Mexico and in the United Statesa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Response estimated from two-variable vector autoregressions with four lags, a time trend, and dummy variables for liberal-
ization and crisis periods using quarterly data. Growth in credit and either GDP or the N-to-T output ratio are the variables; the
sample period is 1980:1 to 1999:4. Finite-sample critical values are generated by Monte Carlo repetitions.
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mildly signiﬁcant and negligible in magnitude. Similarly, the effect on the
N-to-T output ratio in the United States is smaller than in Mexico and not
statistically signiﬁcant. This difference is consistent with the view that
contract enforceability problems are more severe in Mexico than in the
United States. T-sector ﬁrms can overcome these problems, but most
N-sector ﬁrms cannot, and this asymmetry is reﬂected in a strong
response of the N-to-T output ratio. Furthermore, this effect is strong
enough to be reﬂected in aggregate GDP, which is the sum of N-sector
and T-sector production.
Are Other Mechanisms Consistent with the Data?
We have presented a mechanism (based on the model presented in
appendix A) in which causation runs from liberalization to growth, with
ﬁnancial fragility arising as a by-product: liberalization allows the under-
taking of credit risk by ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, most of which are in
the N-sector. This eases borrowing constraints and increases GDP
growth, but it also generates endogenous ﬁnancial fragility. Thus a liber-
alized economy will experience occasional self-fulﬁlling crises, during
which a real depreciation coincides with sharp falls in the credit-to-GDP
and N-to-T output ratios, as ﬁnancially constrained N-sector ﬁrms are hit
especially hard.
This mechanism implies, ﬁrst, that credit growth and the credit-to-
GDP ratio are negatively skewed, experiencing sharp falls during the
occasional crisis; second, that the N-to-T output ratio collapses during
crises and moves in tandem with credit in normal times; and third, that the
N-to-T output ratio responds positively to ﬁnancial liberalization and neg-
atively to trade liberalization. Our data analysis has shown that MECs
have all these predicted characteristics.
Would we observe this behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio if
causation went in another direction, or if ﬁnancial constraints did not play
a key role? Consider, for instance, an alternative view in which faster
GDP growth causes liberalization and an increase in capital inﬂows and in
credit growth. In such a framework, faster GDP growth would lead to a
higher N-to-T output ratio following ﬁnancial liberalization, to a greater
incidence of crises, and to a protracted decline in the ratio in the wake of
a crisis. We are not aware of any argument in which the causation runs
36 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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to explain these patterns and a negatively skewed credit growth path.33
Liberalization may increase long-run growth by improving the quality
of institutions, for instance through a discipline effect that induces struc-
tural reforms that improve property rights and reduce taxation.34 This
channel does not generate ﬁnancial fragility, and it can work side by side
with the mechanism we have identiﬁed here.35
Finally, the asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities between the N- and
T-sectors is key to our argument. In the next section we provide evidence
from microlevel data from the Mexican economic census and stock mar-
ket supporting this sectoral asymmetry.36
The Effects of Liberalization in Mexico
Mexico is a prime example of a country that has shifted from a highly
interventionist to a liberalized economic regime. Given Mexico’s far-
reaching reforms, the signing of NAFTA, and the large capital inﬂows into
Mexico, many observers expected stellar growth performance. In terms of
GDP per capita, Mexico’s performance has in fact been reasonable but
unremarkable. Even during the 1990s Mexico’s annual growth rate was
only about 1 percentage point above the value predicted by its initial
income and population growth (ﬁgure 5), less than in some other countries
that have also liberalized. Moreover, during the last two years exports and
GDP have stopped growing. Why has Mexico’s aggregate growth perfor-
mance failed to meet expectations? Why has there been an export slow-
down? Where can we see the effects of liberalization and NAFTA?
Some have argued that countries like Mexico could have grown faster
had they not liberalized their ﬁnancial markets so fast, and had they
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33. Consider, for instance, the traditional dependent-economy model where the N- and
T-sectors use a common, nonreproducible factor (such as labor or land) and where there are
no credit market imperfections. There is no force in such an economy that would lead to a
greater incidence of crises following ﬁnancial liberalization, generate a negatively skewed
credit growth distribution, or generate a protracted decline in the N-to-T output ratio in the
wake of a crisis.
34. As in Tornell and Velasco (1992).
35. On this point see Kaminski and Schmukler (2002), Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000), and Loayza and Ranciere (2001).
36. Tornell and Westermann (2003) also provide evidence for this sectoral asymmetry
for a set of MECs by looking at survey data from the World Bank.
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 37received more FDI and less capital in the form of risky bank ﬂows. In this
way Mexico could have avoided the lending boom and the tequila crisis.37
We do not agree. We have seen that, across MECs, liberalization leads to
faster growth, but also to ﬁnancial fragility and occasional crises. Mexico
is thus no exception in experiencing a boom and a bust. Something else
must be at work. To ﬁnd out what that is, we compare Mexico’s experi-
ence with the empirical norm presented in the previous sections.
We argue that Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth is not due to liberal-
ization or the lending boom and crisis it engendered, and that, in all like-
lihood, GDP growth would have been slower without liberalization and
NAFTA. In fact, in the wake of the crisis, exports experienced extraordi-
nary growth and GDP growth recovered quite quickly. Instead we argue
that a lack of structural reform and Mexico’s credit crunch, which was
deeper and more protracted than that of the typical MEC, are important
factors behind Mexico’s unremarkable growth performance and the
recent slowdown in exports.38
A distinctive fact about Mexico is that, in the wake of the tequila crisis,
the rapid resumption of GDP growth was accompanied by a protracted
credit crunch. Real credit fell an astounding 58 percent between 1994 and
2002 (top panel of ﬁgure 8). As a result, the credit-to-GDP ratio, which
had increased from 13 percent in 1988 to 49 percent in 1994, fell back to
17 percent in 2002. This credit crunch hit the N-sector particularly hard
and generated bottlenecks that have blocked T-sector growth. As the bot-
tom panel of ﬁgure 8 shows, real credit to the N-sector fell 75 percent
between 1994 and 2002. The policy response to the banking problem and
the sharp deterioration of contract enforceability are key factors con-
tributing to the credit crunch.
We start by summarizing Mexico’s reforms and by comparing several
aspects of Mexico’s performance with international norms. We then
investigate the role of developments in the U.S. economy and of internal
factors in explaining the differences between Mexico’s economic cycle
and that of the typical MEC. Finally, we analyze the credit crunch and
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
37. See, for instance, Stiglitz (2002).
38. This view is consistent with Bergoeing and others (2002), who ﬁnd that most of the
difference in growth between Mexico and Chile over the period 1980–2000 is due to dif-
ferences in total factor productivity (TFP), not differences in capital and labor inputs. They
conclude that the crucial factor that drives the difference in TFP is differences in banking
systems and bankruptcy procedures.
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opportunities that we have emphasized throughout the paper.
Reforms
Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
1986, and by 1987 it had eliminated most of its trade barriers (except in
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Figure 8. Credit in Mexico, 1980–2002a
Source: Banco de México.
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 39agriculture). Mexico went from being a very closed economy to one of
the most open in the world, and it experienced a dramatic increase in
exports. Between 1985 and 2000 nonoil exports jumped from $12 billion
to $150 billion, and the share of trade in GDP rose from 26 percent to
64 percent (figure 9).
Financial liberalization began in 1989. Although Mexico’s capital
account was not totally closed, ﬁnancial markets and capital ﬂows were
heavily regulated. The rules that restricted the opening of bank accounts
and the purchase of stocks by foreigners were relaxed, as were the rules
that had strictly restricted FDI.39 At about the same time, banks were pri-
vatized, and reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, and directed
lending were eliminated. Finally, the limits on the amount of commercial
paper and corporate bonds that ﬁrms could issue, as well as the prohibi-
tion against issuing indexed securities, were lifted.40
NAFTA was signed in 1993 and went into effect on January 1, 1994.
The treaty did not signiﬁcantly reduce trade barriers from their already
low levels. Its signiﬁcance resides in the fact that it codiﬁed the new rules
of the game and greatly reduced the uncertainty faced by investors. On the
one hand, it solidiﬁed the reforms that had been implemented and reduced
the likelihood that the Mexican government would violate investors’
property rights as it had in the past. On the other hand, it made it very
unlikely that the United States or Canada would suddenly impose trade
barriers on some products. NAFTA also established a supranational body
to settle disputes arising under the treaty.41
A key shortcoming of the liberalization program is that it was not
accompanied by badly needed judicial and structural reforms. First, Mex-
ico had and still has severe contract enforceability problems, which make
it very difﬁcult for a creditor to take over the assets of defaulting debtors.
The problems include long delays in the adjudication of commercial dis-
putes, very low salaries for judges, and poor enforcement of judicial deci-
sions.42 Second, structural reforms in key sectors, such as energy, have
40 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
39. In 1989 a new reglamento to the Ley para Promover la Inversión Mexicana y Reg-
ular la Inversión Extranjera (Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regu-
lation of Foreign Investment) was introduced. Then, in 1993, a new FDI law was passed by
congress. This law was subsequently revised in 1998.
40. For a detailed description see Babatz and Conesa (1997) and Martínez and Werner
(2002a).
41. Aspe (1993); Esquivel and Tornell (1998); Lustig (2001); Perry and others (2003).
42. It was not until 2000 that new bankruptcy and guarantee laws were introduced.
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Figure 9. Measures of International Trade in the Mexican Economy, 1980–2003a
Sources: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics; and International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics.
a. Nonoil exports are quarterly data annualized; data for trade as a share of GDP are annual.
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 41not been implemented. This has implied higher costs for other sectors in
the Mexican economy.
The Mexican Experience in Perspective
We have seen that risky lending booms and rare crises are the norm
across fast-growing MECs. Thus it cannot be the case that ﬁnancial liber-
alization and crisis are the causes of Mexico’s lack of stellar growth.
Given the bumpiness it experienced, could Mexico have attained faster
GDP growth? To address this issue we look again at GDP growth rates
(ﬁgure 5). Even during the period of liberalization (1988–99), Mexico’s
GDP grew at an annual rate that was less than 1 percentage point above
the value predicted by its initial income and population growth. This is
around 2 percentage points less than countries with similar bumpiness, as
measured by the skewness of real credit growth. For instance, Chile,
Korea, and Thailand grew at rates of 2 or 3 percentage points above the
predicted values. This indicates that, given its bumpiness, Mexico was an
underperformer during the 1990s. Furthermore, from the ﬁrst quarter of
2001 through the second quarter of 2003, GDP growth has stagnated and
nonoil exports have fallen 1 percent a year on average.43
To explain the negative growth differential and the recent slowdown in
export growth, we compare Mexico’s boom-bust cycle with the average
cycle across the MEC sample (ﬁgure 6). As we explained in the previous
section, this ﬁgure depicts the deviation from the mean in tranquil times
of several macroeconomic variables before, during, and after twin cur-
rency and banking crises.
As the ﬁgure shows, GDP growth in Mexico behaved quite typically
both before and during the crisis. Mexico experienced a recession that
was more severe but also shorter-lived than in the typical MEC during a
crisis. The decline in GDP of about 8 percent in comparison with the
mean during tranquil times lies within the 95 percent conﬁdence interval
of the average MEC. During the immediate recovery phase, GDP growth
in Mexico has been faster than in the typical MEC. In the second and third
42 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
43. From 1980 to 1989 Mexican GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2 percent a
year. Growth then averaged 4 percent a year during the ﬁve boom years preceding the cri-
sis (1990–94); GDP then fell by 6 percent during the crisis year (1995), and GDP growth
averaged 5 percent in the following ﬁve years (1996–2000). The last two years have wit-
nessed stagnation, with an average growth rate of zero. Dornbusch and Werner (1994) ana-
lyze Mexico’s performance prior to 1994.
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in tranquil times, which is outside the 95 percent conﬁdence bands.
The behavior of GDP growth masks the sharp sectoral asymmetry that
we emphasize throughout this paper. As ﬁgure 6 also shows, in the three
years preceding the crisis, the N-to-T output ratio increased by a cumula-
tive 3 percent, despite a negative long-term trend toward T-sector produc-
tion. This change lies within the 95 percent conﬁdence interval of the
average MEC. In contrast, in the three years after the crisis, the N-to-T
output ratio declined cumulatively by about seven times as much as in the
average MEC—a signiﬁcantly larger drop than is typical. Furthermore,
even by the third year after the crisis, this ratio showed no signs of rever-
sion toward its mean in tranquil times. This persistent decline of the
N-to-T output ratio can also be seen in ﬁgure 10, which depicts N-sector
and T-sector production in Mexico from 1988 to 2001.
The abnormal behavior of the N-to-T output ratio in Mexico is closely
linked to that of bank credit. Although the level of credit to GDP, relative
to tranquil times, was already higher, three years before the crisis, than
the international norm, the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico
was typical during the boom but was an outlier in the postcrisis period. As
ﬁgure 6 reveals, Mexico experienced a change in the credit-to-GDP ratio
of about 23 percentage points in the three years preceding the crisis. This
change is above the MEC average, although it lies within the 95 percent
conﬁdence interval for the typical MEC. However, in the wake of the
tequila crisis, Mexico’s credit crunch was both more severe and more pro-
tracted than in the typical MEC. In the three years after the crisis, the
credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico fell by 26 percentage points, signiﬁcantly
more than in the average MEC.
The credit crunch affected mainly the N-sector. As the bottom panel of
ﬁgure 8 shows, total bank credit to the N-sector fell in each year from
1995 to 2002. In contrast, the T-sector was not hard hit by the credit
crunch. As we will show below using microlevel data from the economic
census and from the set of ﬁrms listed on the stock market, in the wake of
the crisis, T-sector ﬁrms in Mexico had signiﬁcantly greater access to
international ﬁnancial markets than did N-sector ﬁrms.
Rapid T-sector growth thus explains why GDP, which is the sum of
N-sector and T-sector output, did not fall as much as either N-sector out-
put or credit, and why robust GDP growth resumed one year after the
crisis. This remarkably fast T-sector growth is associated with the extra-
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ably, export growth in the typical MEC does not display any signiﬁcant
deviation from tranquil times in the wake of a crisis, Mexico’s exports
increased more than 20 percent above their mean in tranquil times in
1995. This increase is certainly an outlier.
The investment-to-GDP ratio behaved typically during the boom
phase. During the crisis, however, it fell signiﬁcantly more than in the
44 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Figure 10. Output in the Tradables and Nontradables Sectors in Mexico, 1988–2001
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics.
a. Manufacturing, mining, and agriculture.
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 44typical MEC, with a –15 percent deviation from tranquil times recorded
in the year after the crisis. Its recovery was also more pronounced, as the
ratio climbed to 8 percent above its level in tranquil times in the third year
after the crisis. Finally, consumption displays a similar cyclical pattern,
although with a much smaller amplitude than that of investment.
In sum, our ﬁndings indicate that the lack of spectacular growth in
Mexico during the 1990s cannot be blamed on liberalization, the boom, or
the crisis. In fact, the effects of liberalization and of NAFTA can be
observed in the extraordinary growth of exports, which drove the fast and
robust recovery of GDP growth in the years following the crisis. How-
ever, the dynamism of exports has faded: since the ﬁrst quarter of 2001,
exports have fallen in absolute terms and GDP has stagnated. What role
have developments in the U.S. economy played in Mexico’s export per-
formance? And what role have internal factors played?
Export Growth
Because a large share of Mexican exports goes to the United States, a
natural question is to what extent developments in the U.S. economy
explain the behavior of exports. In particular, we investigate to what
extent developments in U.S. imports or U.S. manufacturing can account
for the extraordinary growth in Mexico’s exports in 1995–2000 and the
stagnation in 2001–03.44 We will show that developments in the United
States can explain part but not all of the ﬂuctuations in export growth. We
then discuss how the predictions of the model can help explain the resid-
ual export growth. We explain the boom in exports with reference to the
ﬁre sales that occurred during the crisis, and the recent stagnation with
reference to the lack of structural reform, the protracted credit crunch, and
the N-sector bottlenecks they generated. 
Before presenting the results, we wish to emphasize that the strict
macroeconomic policies that Mexico put in place in the wake of the crisis
were necessary for the extraordinary growth in exports. These policies
kept the ﬁscal balance under control and ensured that the peso did not
become overvalued in real terms.
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44. We choose U.S. imports and manufacturing instead of a broader aggregate, such as
U.S. GDP, because our objective is to determine an upper bound on the effect of trends in
the U.S. economy on Mexican exports.
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exports at a quarterly frequency over the period 1988:1–2003:2.45 We
estimate a bivariate VAR that allows for two lags. Since both series have
a unit root and their growth rates are stationary, we perform our analysis
using growth rates.46
It is incorrect to look at the correlation between the levels of two non-
stationary series. In fact, a high correlation coefﬁcient between the levels
of U.S. imports and Mexican exports is meaningless. This is why it is nec-
essary to look at growth rates when considering nonstationary series, and
a vector autoregression is the appropriate tool to analyze such series.
The top left panel of ﬁgure 11, which traces the response of Mexican
exports to a 1-standard-deviation shock to U.S. imports, shows that the
response is equivalent to 3.5 percent of a standard deviation in the ﬁrst
quarter, and to 3, 2.6, and 2.2 percent in the following quarters. All of
these responses are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. 
Although these impulse responses provide information on the effect of
a standardized shock, they do not indicate the extent to which a given
shock contributes to the total forecast error variance of Mexico’s exports.
To assess the relative importance of shocks to U.S. imports, we decom-
pose the forecast error variance of Mexican exports into the part that is
attributable to shocks emanating from the United States and the part
attributable to shocks emanating from Mexico. The top right panel of ﬁg-
ure 11 shows that U.S. shocks account for approximately 40 percent of
the forecast error variance, and shocks from Mexico the remaining 60 per-
cent. In other words, unexpected changes in Mexico’s export growth are
mainly generated by shocks to its own economy. Although statistically
signiﬁcant, U.S. shocks play only a secondary role.
A similar pattern emerges when we estimate the VAR using U.S. man-
ufacturing instead of imports. The long-run effects are of similar magni-
tude, with shocks to U.S. manufacturing accounting for around 40 percent
of the unexpected forecast error variance. However, compared with a
shock to U.S. imports, it takes longer for a shock to U.S. manufacturing to
fully translate into a reaction by Mexican exports. 
46 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
45. An earlier starting date is not appropriate, because the two countries did not trade
much before 1987.
46. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration according to ﬁnite-sample
critical values of Cheung and Lai (1993).
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Figure 11. Estimated Effect on Mexican Exports of Shocks to the U.S. Economya
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Effects are estimated by vector autoregressions for a 1-standard-deviation shock to U.S. imports or to output of the U.S. man-
ufacturing sector. Shaded lines indicate the 95 percent conﬁdence interval.
b. Shares of forecast error variance in the vector autoregression attributable to the indicated U.S. shock and of the remaining
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U.S. shocks, we plot in ﬁgure 12 the average residuals from the VARs.
The unusually high residual growth of exports in the crisis episode and
the negative outliers of recent years indicate that the performance of the
U.S. economy does not fully account for the skyrocketing 28 percent
increase in Mexican exports during 1995, or for the 1 percent fall in
exports in the last two years.
A simpler way to make the same point is to compare the growth rate of
Mexican exports with those of U.S. imports and U.S. manufacturing.
Table 5 shows the average annual growth rates and ﬁgure 13 the detrended
growth differentials. For the comparison with U.S. imports, the largest
deviations occurred during the crisis (1995), with an abnormally large
growth residual of 14 percent (bottom panel), and from 2001:1 to 2003:2,
with a residual of –11 percent. In fact, during some quarters the residuals
are more than 2 standard deviations away from the expected value of zero.
In contrast, the average residuals were relatively small in 1990–94 and
1996–2000 (1 percent and zero, respectively). A similar pattern is
observed in the export growth residuals obtained in the comparison with
U.S. manufacturing.47
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Figure 12. Unexplained Export Growth in Mexico, 1990–2003a
Sources: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Sta-
tistics; and authors’ calculations.











47. These detrended growth differentials have the same interpretation as the residuals
of an ordinary least squares regression of Mexican export growth on U.S. import growth.
The slope coefﬁcient in that regression is 0.83 and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, and
the R2 is 0.3. This shows that 30 percent of the total variance in Mexican exports is
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Table 5. Growth in Mexican Exports and in U.S. Manufacturing and Imports,
1990–2003a
Percent a year
Indicator 1990–94 1995 1996–2000 2001–03b
Export growth in Mexico 15 32 17 –1
Manufacturing growth in the United States 2 5 5 –2
Import growth in the United States 7 11 10 2
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from INEGI and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
a. Averages of quarter-to-quarter growth rates.
b. Through 2003:2.
Figure 13. Relating Mexican Exports to U.S. Performance, 1988–2003a
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics and International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
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credit crunch and lack of structural reform help account for these large
deviations. We then provide empirical evidence in support of these
effects.
Fire Sales and the Bottleneck Effect
In our model economy the real depreciation that accompanies a crisis
severely affects the cash ﬂow of N-sector ﬁrms with currency mismatches
in their borrowing and lending. As a result, N-sector credit and invest-
ment fall. In contrast, access to international ﬁnancial markets combined
with the real depreciation allows T-sector ﬁrms to buy inputs at ﬁre-sale
prices. This leads to rapid growth of exports, T-sector output, and GDP in
the wake of the crisis. 
However, as we discuss in the section on the model, rapid GDP growth
cannot be sustained over a long period if it is driven only by T-sector
growth, because T-sector production needs inputs from the N-sector. The
real depreciation and the credit crunch depress N-sector investment,
which eventually leads to bottlenecks: exporters then no longer have an
abundant and cheap supply of N-sector inputs. Thus, ceteris paribus, at
some point export growth starts falling as competitiveness erodes.
To test whether these predictions of the model apply to Mexico, we look
at the annual manufacturing survey of Mexico’s National Institute of Sta-
tistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI), which includes medium-size
and large ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector, covers more than 80 percent of
manufacturing value added, and includes 206 ﬁve-digit subsectors. First
we assess the importance of N-sector inputs in T-sector production, and
then we contrast the behavior over time of exports that are highly depen-
dent on N-sector inputs and of exports that are less dependent on the
N-sector.
According to this survey, N-sector inputs represented on average
12.4 percent of total variable costs in the manufacturing sector over the
period 1994–99. This share ranges from 5 percent in some food manu-
facturing subsectors to 28 percent in some chemical subsectors. Table 6
shows the shares of the main N-sector inputs used in several manufac-
turing subsectors that use N-sector inputs intensively. For example, the
50 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
explained by U.S. imports. Recall that the VAR showed that 40 percent of the unexpected
forecast error variance is explained by developments in the United States.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 51nonmetallic minerals products subsector devotes 9.5 percent of its expen-
diture to repairs and maintenance, 4.9 percent to rents and leases, 2 per-
cent to freight and transport, 5.6 percent to electricity, and so on.
Not only are N-sector inputs a signiﬁcant fraction of T-sector produc-
tion, but those subsectors that are intensive in N-sector inputs display pre-
cisely the pattern that the model predicts. Figure 14 shows the ratio of
manufacturing exports of the subsectors that use N-sector inputs most
intensively to those that use these inputs least intensively (we call this the
X-difference). The ﬁgure shows three things. First, during the lending
boom period, when the N-sector was booming and investing heavily,
N-sector goods were expensive and the X-difference fell. Second, after
the crisis the situation reversed: in 1996–98 N-sector inputs could be
bought at ﬁre-sale prices, and the X-difference increased. Third, the
recent lack of N-sector investment has generated a dramatic fall in the
X-difference.
In sum, the asymmetric behavior of different export subsectors sup-
ports the view that ﬁre sales contributed to the extraordinary export
52 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Figure 14. Difference in Cumulative Export Growth between Most-Nontradable-
Intensive and Least-Nontradable-Intensive Sectors in Mexico, 1991–2002a
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics.
a. Most- and least-nontradable-intensive sectors are those manufacturing sectors that fall in the highest and lowest quintile,
respectively, as measured by the proportion of nontradable inputs in their exports. Nontradable inputs are total inputs less material
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1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 52growth in the wake of the crisis, and that the bottleneck effect has con-
tributed to the export slowdown over the last two years. We do not rule
out the possibility that other external factors, such as competing exports
from China, have also contributed to the export slowdown. However, it is
unlikely that such external factors could generate the asymmetric export
response we have documented. 
How Did Financial Fragility Emerge?
The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the resources available to
domestic banks. In addition to the increase in capital inﬂows, the consoli-
dated public sector balance swung from a deﬁcit of 8 percent of GDP in
1987 to a surplus of 1 percent in 1993, and credit from the banking system
to the public sector fell from 14 percent of GDP to 2 percent.
Although bank liabilities were often denominated in foreign currency,
the income streams that serviced those liabilities were ultimately denomi-
nated in domestic currency. Sometimes the banks lent in pesos, and when
they lent in dollars, a large share of bank credit went to households and
N-sector ﬁrms, whose products were valued in pesos. In both cases the
banks were incurring the risk of insolvency through currency mismatch.48
As is well known, currency mismatch was also present on the govern-
ment’s books through the famous dollar-denominated tesobonos. 
Agents both in the government and in the private sector understood
that they were taking on credit risk. However, as the model explains, tak-
ing on such risk was individually optimal because of the presence of sys-
temic bailout guarantees and the rosy expectations generated by the
prospect of NAFTA. These expectations may have been well founded,
but unfortunately in 1994 several negative shocks to expectations befell
the country. The first day of the year brought the news of the revolt in the
southern state of Chiapas. Then March witnessed the assassination of the
leading presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio. Although presi-
dential elections took place in July without civil unrest, and Ernesto
Zedillo won with an ample majority, a full-blown crisis erupted at the
end of 1994, a few weeks after he took office.
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48. The share of bank credit allocated to the N-sector reached 63 percent in 1994.
Martínez and Werner (2002b) and Tornell and Westermann (2003) document the existence
of currency mismatch.
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it is the “tipping point” that marks a reversal of capital inﬂows. Instead of
letting the peso depreciate, the monetary authorities responded by letting
reserves fall.49 Central bank reserves net of tesobonos fell from $27 bil-
lion in February to $8 billion in April. They stood at negative $14 billion
at the end of 1994. 
What Accounts for Mexico’s Credit Crunch?
As mentioned earlier, Mexico’s credit crunch is an outlier relative to
that experienced by the typical postcrisis MEC. Not only did real credit
suffer a sharp fall during the crisis, but it continued falling until 2002.
Credit growth resumed in 2002, but it again turned negative in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2003. This path of credit is all the more puzzling when one con-
siders that the share of bank assets owned by foreigners increased from
6.4 percent in 1994 to 88 percent in 2001 (ﬁgure 15), and the foreign
banks are arguably well capitalized.
Two important factors have contributed to the deepening credit crunch:
the deterioration in contract enforceability and the policy response to the
nonperforming loans (NPLs) problem. We consider each in turn. 
In the wake of the crisis, many borrowers stopped servicing their debts,
and this noncompliance went unpunished by the authorities. As a result, a
cultura de no pago (culture of nonpayment) developed: borrowers that
could have paid chose not to pay. This deterioration in law enforcement
has manifested itself in other ways, such as an increase in tax evasion and
in crime generally. Figure 16 shows that whereas tax collection improved
and crime fell through the mid-1990s, both have deteriorated since. In
terms of our model, this pattern implies a decline in the coefﬁcient of
enforceability, which induces a fall in the credit multiplier and in the
investment of credit-constrained ﬁrms.
Because of the currency mismatch, all banks were de facto bankrupt
in the wake of the crisis. However, regulatory discipline was not imme-
diately established: only a small share of NPLs were officially recog-
nized. The banks’ bailout took the form of exchanging the officially
recognized NPLs for ten-year government bonds that paid interest but
could not be traded.50 This piecemeal rescue program, which was meant
54 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
49. See, for instance, Lustig (2001) and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b).
50. For an analysis of the banking problem see Krueger and Tornell (1999).
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Figure 15. Share of Assets in the Mexican Banking System Held 
by Foreigners, 1992–2001
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Figure 16. Measures of Law Enforcement in Mexico, 1980–2001
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Despite rapid GDP growth, the share of NPLs in total loans kept rising,
from 15 percent in 1995 to 21 percent in 1998, before gradually declin-
ing. During this period banks were not making new loans but were mak-
ing profits because they were receiving interest income on the
government bonds they had received in exchange for their NPLs. 
The increased cost of the rescue package is associated with the fact that
banks were saddled with nonrecognized de facto NPLs (that is, evergreen
accounts) and failed to increase their capital in order to make new loans
(ﬁgure 17).52 The quality of the portfolio deteriorated over time as moral
hazard problems developed and the accrued interest of the evergreen
accounts had to be capitalized.
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51. Notice that this program is different from the systemic guarantees we consider in
the model below. Under the latter, bailouts are not granted on an idiosyncratic basis, but
only if a systemic meltdown takes place. 
52. Evergreen accounts are those in which the bank lends the debtor the principal plus
interest that the debtor was supposed to have repaid, and these transfers are counted as
“loans.”
Figure 17. Nonperforming Loans as a Share of Total Corporate Lending 
in Mexico, 1985–2002a
Source: Banco de México.
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lem. First, in 2000 the bankruptcy and guarantee laws were reformed so
as to limit ex post judicial discretion in the disposition of loan collateral
and in the resolution of insolvent ﬁrms. However, given certain imple-
mentation problems and the limited power under the Mexican constitution
of creditors to exercise their collateral rights, it is not yet clear whether
the reforms will lead in practice to better contract enforceability. Second,
key loopholes in bank accounting have been eliminated. Third, part of the
debt overhang problem has been resolved (mainly the smaller debts)
through the Punto Final program. However, unresolved problems remain
in the areas of judicial reform and the resolution of large debts.
Sectoral Asymmetries: What Do Microlevel Data Say?
The existence of sectoral asymmetries in ﬁnancing opportunities is a
key element in our theoretical argument, as well as in our account of the
Mexican experience. Here we will show that, in Mexico, T-sector ﬁrms
are on average larger than N-sector ﬁrms and have better access to inter-
national ﬁnancial markets. We will also show that T-sector ﬁrms were not
as hard hit by the credit crunch as N-sector ﬁrms.
To establish these facts we analyze two Mexican microeconomic data
sets: the ﬁrst consists of data on ﬁrms listed on the Mexican stock market
(the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, or BMV), and the second is the eco-
nomic census. The BMV set contains only those ﬁrms that issue either
bonds or equity (310 ﬁrms), whereas the census includes all ﬁrms in the
economy (2,788,222 ﬁrms).
As table 7 shows, the BMV set contains only large ﬁrms, whereas the
vast majority of ﬁrms in the economy are small and medium-size. More-
over, although the BMV set contains both N- and T-sector ﬁrms, it is
more representative of the T-sector than of the N-sector. The bias is
greater for the N-sector than for the T-sector both in terms of the distribu-
tion of ﬁxed assets (ﬁgure 18) and in terms of sales. For instance, as table 7
also shows, the sales of large N-sector ﬁrms constitute only 12 percent of
economy-wide N-sector sales, according to the census of 1999, whereas
the corresponding share for large T-sector ﬁrms is 64 percent (excluding
ﬁnancial ﬁrms in both cases).
Because the BMV set is biased toward the T-sector, and ﬁrms in this
set are the only ones that issue bonds and equity internationally, it follows
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53. Tornell and Westermann (2003), using survey data from the World Bank, ﬁnd a
similar sectoral asymmetry across MECs.
54. New equity issues are typically placed in New York through American depository
rights (ADRs). 
Table 7. Mexican Firms in Tradables and Nontradables Sectors by Firm Size, 1999a
Economic Census
Share of sector sales  BMV-listed ﬁrms 
Number of ﬁrms (percent) (number)
Firm size Nontradable Tradable Nontradable Tradable Nontradable Tradable
Smallb 2,371,468 329,242 56 10 0 0
Mediumc 65,630 12,054 32 26 0 0
Larged 4,239 5,589 12 64 110 200
Sources: Economic Census of Mexico and Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. 
a. Tradables sectors include primary goods and manufacturing. Nontradables sectors include construction, trade, telecommu-
nications, transportation, hotels and restaurants, real estate, and other services. Financial services, electricity, gas, and water are
not included in nontradables. For those ﬁrms entering between 2000 and 2002 or exiting between 1991 and 1999, data are for the
year closest to 1999 for which data on total assets were available. The Bolsa Mexicana de Valores is the principal Mexican stock
exchange.
b. Fixed assets less than $148,000 in 1994 dollars.
c. Fixed assets greater than $148,000 but less than $2,370,000 in 1994 dollars.
d. Fixed assets greater than $2,370,000 in 1994 dollars.
that the T-sector has better access to international ﬁnancial markets than
the N-sector. To the extent that Mexico is typical of other MECs, this fact
provides an important warning. In contrast to HECs, in MECs stock
market-based data sets (such as Datastream or Worldscope) do not reﬂect
economy-wide behavior but rather are biased toward the T-sector.53
To get an idea of the extent to which the crisis affected the access of
BMV ﬁrms to external ﬁnancing, consider the ratio of issuance of long-
term bonds and equity to the stock of bonds and equity. Table 8 shows
that this ratio jumped from an average of 1.6 percent in 1991–94 to
4.7 percent in 1996–97.54 This jump indicates that BMV ﬁrms were not
hard hit by the credit crunch. 
Another fact that points in the same direction is that there was no sig-
niﬁcant increase in bankruptcies among BMV ﬁrms. As table 9 shows,
6 percent of ﬁrms exited the BMV in 1995, and 3 percent in 1996. The
average rate of exit over the entire sample period was 3.6 percent, with a
standard deviation of 3.5 percent. The increase in bankruptcies in 1995
was therefore not statistically signiﬁcant.
The availability of external ﬁnance for the BMV ﬁrms contrasts with
the protracted fall in the nationwide credit-to-GDP ratio over 1995–2001.
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The reason is that the BMV ﬁrms shifted away from domestic bank credit
in the wake of the crisis. This shift is reﬂected in the increase in the share
of foreign-denominated debt from an average of 35 percent of the total in
1990–94 to 45 percent during the credit crunch period (1996–2000;
table 10). Since the BMV set is biased toward the T-sector, this contrast in
ﬁnancing opportunities explains why T-sector production did not fall so
sharply in the wake of the crisis, and why GDP recovered so fast.
Figure 18. Size of Tradables and Nontradables Sector Firmsa
Source: Banco de México.
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Table 8. Issuance of Long-Term Bonds and Equity by Firms Listed on the Mexican
Stock Market, 1991–2001a
Percent of outstanding stock of bonds plus equities
Year Long-term bondsb Equity Total
1991 0.5 0.4 0.9
1992 1.7 0.2 2.0
1993 2.0 0.2 2.2
1994 1.1 0.1 1.3
1995 0.5 0.0 0.5
1996 3.8 0.0 3.8
1997 5.0 0.7 5.8
1998 3.0 0.0 3.0
1999 1.1 0.3 1.4
2000 3.1 0.0 3.2
2001 2.0 0.0 2.0
Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. 
a. Data are averages for all nonﬁnancial ﬁrms listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores for which balance sheet data were
available. Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Bonds with maturity of one year or longer.
Table 9. Entry and Exit from the Mexican Stock Market, 1990–2002
Percent of listed ﬁrmsa














Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. 
a. Listed ﬁrms include some privately held ﬁrms that have issued corporate bonds.
b. Firms that left the stock market or that were suspended and remained suspended as of 2003.
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ﬁrms, we look instead at the behavior of investment. We group the obser-
vations into quintiles and compute the change in the investment rate
between 1994 and 1999.55 Figure 19 shows that, within each size class,
the investment rate fell more in the N-sector than in the T-sector ﬁrms.
Furthermore, the quintile that contains the largest T-sector ﬁrms is the
only group that experienced an increase in the investment rate. Table 11,
which reports the average investment rate across all size classes, shows
that in 1994, before the crisis, both sectors had essentially the same
investment rate (about 7 percent). In contrast, in 1999 the investment rate
of the N-sector was almost 1 percentage point lower than that in the
T-sector (3.7 percent versus 4.6 percent). 
To see whether the sectoral asymmetry we observe across the quintile
of largest ﬁrms in ﬁgure 19 is associated with an asymmetry in ﬁnancing
opportunities, we run a standard cash-ﬂow regression similar to that by
Steven Fazzari, Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce Petersen.56 We regress the
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55. Because of conﬁdentiality requirements, each observation represents not a single
ﬁrm but a group of ﬁrms. Each group contains ﬁrms that are similar in size, are in the same
subsector, and are located in the same geographical area. See the appendix for details.
56. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
Table 10. Foreign Liabilities of Firms Listed on the Mexican Stock Market,
1990–2002
Percent of total liabilities
Firms in  Firms in  
tradables nontradables
Year All ﬁrms sectors sectors
1990 31.6 34.0 23.8
1991 32.9 36.5 23.7
1992 32.7 36.0 25.0
1993 36.0 39.3 29.3
1994 43.9 50.5 30.6
1995 46.4 53.5 34.2
1996 44.8 52.7 32.6
1997 47.4 54.8 37.2
1998 48.4 56.6 37.8
1999 44.9 52.1 36.4
2000 45.4 51.8 37.0
2001 44.4 52.1 35.6
2002 40.6 46.7 33.1
Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. 
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Table 11. Investment Rates of Firms in Tradables and Nontradables Sectors, 
1994 and 1999




Ratio of nontradables to tradables investment rate 1.03 0.81
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Mexican Economic Census.
Figure 19. Change in the Investment Rate in Mexico by Firm Size, 1994–99a
Sources: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics and authors’ calculations.
a. Investment rate is measured as net investment in ﬁxed assets divided by total ﬁxed assets.















investment rate on the change in sales, on cash ﬂow, and on cash ﬂow
interacted with a dummy that equals 1 for nonexporting ﬁrms during the
years 1995–97 or 1995–98. Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen,
we interpret a positive effect of cash ﬂow on investment as an indication
of ﬁnancing constraints (the change in sales controls for investment
opportunities). We estimate the regression including ﬁxed effects and
using a generalized least squares estimator. The positive coefﬁcient on the
interaction dummy in table 12 implies that, in the wake of the crisis, cash
ﬂow was a more important determinant of investment for nonexporters
than for exporters. This means that nonexporters were more credit con-
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 62strained in the wake of the crisis. This effect is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level in 1995–97 and at the 10 percent level in 1995–98.
Capital Flows
During the last two decades, capital inﬂows to MECs have increased
enormously, and so has the importance of private ﬂows (ﬁgure 20). In the
average MEC the share of private ﬂows has increased from 60 percent in
the mid-1980s to more than 90 percent by the end of the 1990s. In Mexico
these shares are 40 and 80 percent, respectively. 
Mexico falls in the midrange of MECs in terms of capital inﬂows.
Between 1980 and 1999 net capital inﬂows to Mexico were on average
equivalent to 3.3 percent of GDP (rising to 4.3 percent after liberalization).
This is a remarkably high number, given that Mexico liberalized only in
1989 and experienced a crisis in 1994. During the same period the compa-
rable ratio for Korea was 2 percent, and that for Thailand was 3.9 percent
(4.9 percent after liberalization). The ratio for Chile was 8.1 percent. 
FDI is considered a “good” form of capital inﬂow, whereas bank ﬂows
are considered “bad” because they are foreign loans to domestic banks.
Such loans are risky because of the currency mismatch. In Mexico the
share of bank ﬂows peaked in 1994 at about 25 percent of cumulative
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Table 12. Regressions Explaining Investment Rates with Cash Flow and Salesa
Independent variableb 12-1 12-2
Cash ﬂow  0.04*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Change in sales  0.05*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.00)
Cash ﬂow interacted with crisis and   0.15*** 0.05*
nonexporter dummiesc (0.05) (0.03)
Summary statistics:
No. of observations 1,430 1,592
No. of ﬁrms 328 338
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.194
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The regressions are estimated with ﬁxed effects by generalized least squares and include year dummies (not reported). Stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, *** at the 1 per-
cent level.
b. Cash ﬂow and change in sales are expressed as a ratio to the capital stock in the previous period.
c. The crisis dummy variable equals 1 for the years 1995–97 in column 12-1 and for the years 1995–98 in column 12-2. The
nonexporter dummy variable equals 1 if the ﬁrm does not export.
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ure 20). In contrast, the share of FDI in cumulative capital inﬂows has
increased gradually, from 35 percent in 1980 to 57 percent in 2002, but at
a faster pace after the tequila crisis. The impressive increase in FDI in the
wake of the crisis can be considered one tangible effect of NAFTA.
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Figure 20. Cumulative Capital Inﬂows in Medium Contract Enforceability Countries
and in Mexico, 1980–2001
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; and Banco de México.
a. Sample data are available for total capital inﬂows during the period 1980–99 only.













































57. This share can be viewed as a lower bound on inﬂows to the banking sector,
because some banks also received FDI and portfolio ﬂows.
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tion has led to ﬁnancial fragility is that an important share of capital
inﬂows takes the form of bank ﬂows. Many have argued that the greater
the share of inﬂows in the form of FDI and the lower the share of bank
credit, the lower is ﬁnancial fragility. To evaluate this argument we must
keep in mind a key fact overlooked by the literature.
Stylized fact 5. The lion’s share of FDI is directed mostly to the T-sector
or to ﬁnancial institutions.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure 21. Because the nonﬁnancial N-sector
receives a small share of FDI, bank ﬂows remain the main source of exter-
nal ﬁnance for most N-sector ﬁrms. Since this group of ﬁrms is ﬁnancially
constrained, a reduction in risky bank ﬂows and credit may mean that
N-sector investment and growth will fall. As there are productive linkages
throughout the economy, the unconstrained T-sector will also be nega-
tively affected. Hence it is possible that the net effect of banning risky
bank ﬂows is to reduce long-run GDP growth. Here again we see that, in
the presence of credit market imperfections, a policy that reduces ﬁnan-
cial fragility can, as a by-product, lead to a fall in growth.58
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58. We do not analyze here how the new theories of FDI account for the stylized fact
that the largest share of nonﬁnancial FDI is allocated to the T-sector. Vertical motives for
FDI involve fragmentation of production across countries (Markusen, 2002). Horizontal 
Figure 21. FDI in Mexico by Sector, 1980–2001
Source: Banco de México.
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We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, which leads to lending booms and occasional ﬁnancial
crises. On net, however, both trade and ﬁnancial liberalization have led to
faster long-run growth across the set of countries with functioning ﬁnan-
cial markets.
We have presented a model that establishes a causal link from liberal-
ization to growth. Trade liberalization promotes efﬁciency and growth
mainly in the tradables sector. Financial liberalization adds even more to
growth because it eases ﬁnancing constraints, leading to an increase in
investment by ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, most of which are in the non-
tradables sector. However, the easing of ﬁnancing constraints takes place
through the undertaking of credit risk, which leads to ﬁnancial fragility
and occasional crises.
Mexico, a prominent liberalizer, failed to attain stellar GDP growth in
the 1990s, and since 2001 its GDP and exports have stagnated. We have
argued that this does not imply that liberalization is bad for growth. In
fact, the beneﬁts of liberalization can be seen in the extraordinary growth
of exports and FDI during the 1990s. The key to the Mexican puzzle lies
in the lack of structural reform after 1995 and in Mexico’s response to cri-
sis: the credit crunch in Mexico has been far deeper and far more pro-
tracted than in the typical country. The credit crunch has hit the N-sector
especially hard and has generated bottlenecks, which have contributed to
the recent fall in exports. In sum, the lack of spectacular growth in Mex-
ico cannot be blamed on wrongheaded reforms in the early 1990s, but on
the lack of further judicial and structural reform after 1995. 
We conclude with a list of nine lessons that derive from the experience
of countries with functioning ﬁnancial markets, and of Mexico in particu-
lar. First, although several observers have claimed that ﬁnancial liberal-
ization is not good for growth because of the crises associated with it, this
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motives for FDI imply that ﬁrms invest abroad when the gains from avoiding trade costs
outweigh the costs of maintaining capacity in a foreign country. Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2003) test this theory using U.S. data and ﬁnd that the least productive ﬁrms serve
only the domestic market, that relatively more productive ﬁrms export, and that the most
productive ﬁrms engage in FDI. A third theory, based on the role of information in driving
FDI, might also help account for this fact (Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2003).
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countries with functioning ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial liberalization leads
to faster average long-run growth, even though it also leads to occasional
crises. This gain in growth is over and above the gain derived from trade
liberalization. 
A second, closely related lesson is that the growth-enhancing ﬁnancial
deepening that follows liberalization is not a smooth process. Rather, it
takes place through boom-bust cycles. Occasional crises are the price that
has to be paid to attain faster growth in the presence of severe contract
enforceability problems. The ﬁrst-best solution is to implement judicial
reform and improve contract enforceability. In the absence of such
reforms, liberalization permits ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to attain
greater leverage and invest more, at the cost of undertaking credit risk.
Credit risk creates an environment of rapid growth and ﬁnancial fragility.
Third, to analyze the effects of liberalization it is not sufﬁcient to look
at aggregate data alone. Sectoral asymmetries play a key role: many trad-
ables (T-) sector ﬁrms have access to international capital markets,
whereas most nontradables (N-) sector ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained
and depend on banks for their ﬁnancing. Trade liberalization and agree-
ments such as NAFTA promote faster productivity growth in the T-sector
but are of little direct help to the N-sector. Financial liberalization leads
to an increase in international bank flows, which allows financially
constrained firms to borrow more. Since many of these firms are in the
N-sector, a currency mismatch on ﬁrms’ balance sheets develops, making
the economy prone to self-fulﬁlling crises. In short, ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion generates crises in countries with contract enforcement problems
because ﬁnancial liberalization is associated with international lending to
the N-sector.
We agree with the general view that FDI is the safest form of capital
inﬂow. Our fourth lesson, however, is that FDI does not obviate the need
for risky international bank ﬂows. FDI goes mostly to T-sector ﬁrms and
ﬁnancial institutions. As a result, bank ﬂows are practically the only
source of external ﬁnance for most N-sector ﬁrms. Curtailing such risky
ﬂows would reduce N-sector investment and generate bottlenecks that
would limit long-run growth. Bank ﬂows are hardly to be recommended,
but for most ﬁrms it might be that or nothing. Clearly, allowing risky cap-
ital ﬂows does not mean that anything goes. Appropriate prudential regu-
lation must also be in place. 
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Sustainable growth, however, cannot be assured unless the banking prob-
lem is ﬁxed. Recovery in aggregate activity is typically not uniform
across the economy. The tradables sector may grow strongly while the
nontradables sector recuperates only sluggishly. This asymmetric response
is intimately linked to a severe credit crunch that hits the N-sector partic-
ularly hard and that goes hand in hand with a steady increase in the share
of nonperforming loans. The Mexican experience shows that NPLs are
unlikely to disappear on their own, even if GDP growth resumes quickly.
This raises the question of whether a policy under which all NPLs are rec-
ognized at once and the ﬁscal costs are all paid up front is preferable to a
piecemeal policy.
A sixth and somewhat conjectural lesson of the Mexican experience is
that long-run growth cannot be based solely on export growth. Because
the T-sector depends on N-sector inputs, it is necessary that the N-sector
also grow in order to attain a balanced and sustainable growth path. This
requires adequate ﬁnancing for domestically oriented ﬁrms and structural
reform in key sectors, such as energy. From the data up to June 2003 it
can be cogently argued that if there is a lack of N-sector investment over
a long period, a bottleneck effect will eventually set in and block export
growth, as has been observed in Mexico since 2001. 
A seventh lesson is that crises are part of the growth process in ﬁnan-
cially liberalized countries with contract enforcement problems. At the
“tipping point,” beyond which it is unlikely that capital outﬂows will
reverse, authorities should focus on what to do after the crisis instead of
attempting to forestall the crisis. Delaying an inevitable crisis will tend to
make the effects of the full-blown crisis far worse, as attested by the expe-
riences of Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001.
Finally, one can draw two lessons for empirical implementation. First,
stock market microlevel data sets are not representative of the economy as
a whole and overemphasize the T-sector. This is demonstrated by com-
paring the Mexican stock market data base with the Mexican Economic
Census, which includes all ﬁrms in the economy. Second, statistical vari-
ance is not a good instrument with which to identify ﬁnancial fragility.
Fragility is associated with infrequent but severe crises and therefore with
both high variance and negative skewness. High variance, however, may
reﬂect high-frequency shocks, which may be exogenous or self-inﬂicted,
for instance by bad economic policy. Negative skewness tests speciﬁcally
68 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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by-product of a rapid-growth path.
APPENDIX A
The Model 
Here we formalize our intuitive argument and show that it is indeed
part of an internally consistent story. The equilibrium will establish a
causal link from ﬁnancial liberalization to ﬁnancial deepening to GDP
growth. Also, it will show that, in the presence of credit market imperfec-
tions, the forces that generate ﬁnancial deepening generate ﬁnancial
fragility as well. Furthermore, the equilibrium will impose restrictions on
the sample of countries over which the mechanism operates and on the
behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio.59
We consider a simple dynamic general-equilibrium model of an econ-
omy with two sectors: a tradables (T) sector, which produces the con-
sumption good, and a nontradables (N) sector, which produces an
intermediate good used as an input in the production of both goods. As
will be seen, the fact that the N-sector demands its own goods is key for
ﬁnancial fragility to arise in equilibrium. The assumption that T-sector
production uses N-sector inputs is key to generate the bottleneck effect
that we have used to explain the recent slowdown in Mexican exports.60
We denote the relative price of N-sector goods (that is, the inverse of
the real exchange rate) by pt = pt
N/pt
T.61 T-sector goods are produced using
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59. The model is based on Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming) and Ranciere, Tornell,
and Westermann (2003). It combines elements of the ﬁnancial accelerator framework
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 2000) with elements of third-generation balance of pay-
ments crisis models. See, for instance, Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee (2000), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Calvo (1998),
Chang and Velasco (1998), Chinn and Kletzter (2000), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini
(1999), Edwards and Végh (1997), Krugman (1999), McKinnon and Pill (1999), and Tirole
(2002). The model is also linked to Konrad (1992) and Sinn (1986), who link risk and
growth.
60. The bottleneck effect implies that low N-sector investment hinders T-sector growth
over the long run. Since the economy is small and open, the destination of T-sector goods
is not important for our argument.
61. Betts and Kehoe (2002) ﬁnd that, in a set of ﬁfty-two countries over the period
1980–2000, real exchange rate variations mainly reﬂect changes in the relative price of 
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α, with α ∈ (0,1). In any equi-
librium it follows that T-sector output and T-sector demand for N-sector
goods are, respectively,
N-sector goods are produced using N-sector goods as inputs (It) accord-
ing to 
The investable funds of an N-sector ﬁrm consist of the debt it issues (Bt)
plus its cash ﬂow (wt). The ﬁrm’s budget constraint, in terms of T-sector
goods, is thus
To allow for the possibility of financial fragility, we assume that there
are two one-period debt instruments: N-debt (bt
n), which promises repay-
ment in N-sector goods, pt+1(1 +ρ t
n)bt
n, and T-debt (bt), which promises
repayment in T-sector goods, (1 +ρ t)bt. We can interpret T-sector debt
as foreign currency-denominated and N-debt as domestic currency-
denominated. As we will show, the price may take two values in equilib-
rium. Since ﬁrms produce N-sector goods, N-debt is a perfect hedge,
whereas T-debt may be risky. 
In modeling the N-sector we make two assumptions to capture the key
features of MECs discussed previously. First, N-sector ﬁnancing is sub-
ject to contract enforceability problems. Second, there are systemic
bailout guarantees that cover lenders against systemic meltdowns. We
follow Martin Schneider and Tornell and model the contract enforceabil-
ity problem by assuming that ﬁrms are run by dynasties of two-period-
lived managers who cannot commit to repay debt: if at time t the young
manager incurs a nonpecuniary cost h[wt + Bt], then at t + 1 she will be
able to divert all the returns to herself, provided the ﬁrm is solvent.62
() . A3 pI w B tt t t =+
() . A2 1 qI tt + =θ
() , ( )( / ) . /( – ) A1 11 ya d d p a p tt t t t t == αα α
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N-sector and T-sector goods, not movements in the international relative prices of T-sector
goods. Among some industrial countries the latter channel is more important (Engel, 1999).
62. Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming). Two comments are in order. First, one can
think of N-sector ﬁrms as banks that lend to the N-sector. This captures the fact that, in
MECs, banks are heavily exposed to the N-sector. The banking system is the channel 
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when deciding whether to lend, they take into account that the goal of
every manager is to maximize the next period’s expected proﬁts net of
diversion costs.63
The ﬁrm is solvent next period if revenue qt+1pt+1 is no lower than the
promised debt repayment Lt+1 plus the young manager’s wage (1 – β) ×
pt+1qt+1. In this case the old manager distributes the remaining proﬁts,
πt+1 =β qt+1pt+1 –Lt+1, as a dividend to herself. To capture the costs of ﬁnan-
cial meltdowns, we assume that under insolvency a large share 1 – µw of
revenue is dissipated, the young manager gets a small amount of seed
money µwpt+1qt+1, with µw< 1 – β, and the old manager gets zero. Lenders
get Lt+1 if a bailout is granted and zero otherwise. Since guarantees are
systemic, bailouts are paid out if and only if many borrowers go bankrupt.
For concreteness, we assume that there is a bailout agency that repays
lenders 100 percent of what they were promised (Lt) if a majority of bor-
rowers go bankrupt.64
To close the description of the economy, we note that the real exchange
rate is determined by the N-sector goods market-clearing condition:
Since there are no exogenous shocks, the only source of risk is endoge-
nous real exchange rate variability. As we will show, there are equilibria
where equation A4 holds at two values of  if firms are solvent
and  if they are insolvent.65
Trade and ﬁnancial liberalization will mean a reduction in impedi-
ments to trade in goods and assets, rather than a shift away from autarky.
pt+1
pp tt : +1
() ( ) () ( ) . – A4 1 dp Ip qI tt tt t t +=
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through which capital inﬂows reach the N-sector; it is also the weak link during crises. Sec-
ond, the enforceability problem we have considered is just a simple way to introduce an
agency problem and generate borrowing constraints.
63. Recall the distinction between unconditional and systemic guarantees we made ear-
lier. If all debt were covered by unconditional guarantees and a bailout were granted when-
ever there was an idiosyncratic default, the enforceability problem would become
irrelevant, and borrowing constraints would not arise in equilibrium.
64. Here we do not analyze how the subsidy implicit in the guarantees is paid for. This
cost could be ﬁnanced by domestic taxation if we assumed that T-sector goods were pro-
duced using a ﬁxed factor. In this case the subsidy would be paid for by taxing this ﬁxed
factor. This is done by Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003).
65. There are multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria as in Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Obst-
feld (1986).
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taking on credit risk that might lead to insolvency. Since the only source
of risk is real exchange rate variability, this is equivalent to allowing
agents to issue only N-sector debt. Financial liberalization eliminates
these regulations, and so agents can issue both types of debt. As will be
seen, liberalization will lead to a currency mismatch and lending booms
that end in busts. The effects of trade liberalization are not the focus of the
model. Since these reforms typically increase T-sector efﬁciency, they
can be represented by an increase in the productivity parameter at in equa-
tion A1. To isolate the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization, we set at to 1.66
Financing and Investment Decisions
Consider ﬁrst a nonliberalized economy. Since lenders are risk neutral
and the opportunity cost of capital is 1 + r, the interest rate that they
require satisﬁes [1 + ρt
n]Et(pt+1) = 1 + r. Furthermore, to avoid diversion
by the ﬁrm, lenders impose a borrowing constraint: (1 + r)bt
n ≤ h(wt + bt
n).
If investment yields a return that is higher than the opportunity cost of
capital, the ﬁrm will borrow up to an amount at which the credit constraint
binds. Thus the budget constraint in equation A3 implies that credit and
investment are
Notice that a necessary condition for borrowing constraints to arise is
h < 1 + r. If h, the index of contract enforceability, were greater than the
cost of capital, it would always be cheaper to repay debt than to divert.
Thus lenders will not impose a ceiling on the amount they are willing to
lend and agents will not be ﬁnancially constrained. This is why, in the
empirical part of the paper, we differentiate high-h from low-h countries. 
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66. Clearly, in the real world ﬁnancial liberalization opens the possibility for agents to
take on credit risk in many other ways than by just allowing them to choose a risky debt
instrument. Here we capture this idea in a parsimonious way that allows us to obtain
closed-form solutions, which in turn allows us to make it clear why, in an economy with
credit market imperfections, ﬁnancial liberalization leads to faster growth only if it leads to
fragility.
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N- and T-debt. If there is enough real exchange rate variability, T-debt is
risky and might lead to insolvency:  A
ﬁrm might nonetheless choose T-debt and risk insolvency because risky
T-debt is cheaper than safe N-debt. To see why, suppose for a moment
that tomorrow’s real exchange rate can take on two values. With proba-
bility u it takes an appreciated value  that leaves every ﬁrm solvent,
whereas with probability 1 – u it takes a depreciated value  that
makes all N-sector ﬁrms go bankrupt and generates a crisis. Since lenders
constrain credit to ensure that borrowers will repay in the no-crisis state,
it follows that in the no-crisis state debt is repaid in full and there is no
bailout. Meanwhile, in the crisis state there is bankruptcy, and each
lender receives a bailout equal to what he was promised. Thus the interest
rate on T-debt is 1 +ρ t = 1 + r, whereas that on N-debt is 1 +ρ t
n = (1 + r)/
It follows that choosing T-debt over N-debt reduces
the cost of capital from 1 + r to [1 + r]u. Lower expected debt repay-
ments, in turn, ease the borrowing constraint as lenders will lend up to an
amount that equates u[1 + r]bt with h[wt + bt]. Therefore credit and
investment are
By comparing equation A6 with equation A5 we obtain the following
result. 
Result 1. In the presence of systemic bailout guarantees, taking on credit
risk allows agents to reduce the expected value of debt repayments, which
eases borrowing constraints and increases the investment multiplier: 
mr > ms.
This increase in leverage is possible because systemic guarantees mean
that, in a crisis, lenders expect to be bailed out. The fact that T-debt is
cheaper than N-debt does not imply that agents will always be willing to
issue T-debt. This is because, with probability 1 – u, T-debt will result in
bankruptcy for a borrower. One can show that it is individually optimal to
choose T-debt if crises are rare events and there is enough real exchange
rate variability: 
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make the production of N-sector goods proﬁtable, and that in the bad state
there is a critical mass of insolvencies so that lenders will be bailed out.67
Next we investigate when it is that currency mismatches generate price
sequences that satisfy the condition in equation A7. 
Equilibria
In the two economies we have considered, investment is given by 
It = mt[wt/pt], and cash ﬂow equals the representative manager’s wage: 
wt = [1 – βt]ptqt, where βt equals β under solvency and µw under insol-
vency. Thus the market-clearing condition in equation A4 implies that in
any equilibrium 
where the investment multiplier mt can take the value ms or mr. Combining
equation A8 with equations A1 and A2, we have that, in a symmetric equi-
librium, N-sector output, prices, and T-sector output evolve according to 
In a nonliberalized economy the share of N-sector output that the N-sector
commands for investment purposes is φs = (1 – β)/(1 – hδ) during every
period. Thus there exists an equilibrium in such an economy if and only if
two conditions hold: ﬁrst, that the degree of contract enforceability satis-
ﬁes so  that  φt is less than 1; and second, that N-sector pro-
ductivity satisﬁes  so that the production of N-sector
goods has a positive net present value (βθpt+1)/pt ≥δ –1.
θθ δ β φ αα >= [()], –– / s 11
hh <= β δ –1
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67. For a derivation of this result see Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming).
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just characterized, where agents choose not to issue T-debt. There is also
a risky equilibrium, which is composed of lucky paths punctuated by
crises. (An economy is on a lucky path at time t if there was no crisis
either at t – 1 or at t.) Along a lucky path of this equilibrium, all debt is
denominated in T-sector goods, and lenders will be bailed out in the next
period if a majority of ﬁrms go bust. Since the debt burden is not indexed
to pt, there are two market-clearing prices. At the high price, ﬁrms are
solvent and their cash ﬂow is  Thus φt = (1 – β)mr. However, at
the low price N-sector ﬁrms are insolvent, and their cash ﬂow is only
Moreover, it can be shown that when  leverage is too
low for fragility to arise and the real exchange rate to take on two values
at t + 1. Thus, at the time of the crisis, agents ﬁnd it optimal to issue
N-debt, and the investment share is φt = µwms. 
Risk taking resumes in the period after the crisis. Therefore the path of
N-sector investment is
The sequence {qt, pt, yt,} is then determined by using equation A12 to
replace φt in equations A9 through A11. One can show that if crises are
rare events, there are thresholds for the degree of contract enforceability
and for N-sector productivity, such that if  returns
satisfy equation A7, and thus a risky equilibrium exists. Notice that 
and ensure that when crises are rare events, investment is prof-
itable. Meanwhile, and  ensure that ﬁrms with T-debt go
bankrupt in the bad state, and that the fall in cash ﬂow is translated into a
large fall in credit and N-sector investment, so that the fall in prices is val-
idated. This establishes the second result. 
Result 2. Financial liberalization increases investment in the ﬁnancially
constrained sector, but only if it makes the economy ﬁnancially fragile
and agents ﬁnd it proﬁtable to take on credit risk. This occurs only if the
degree of contract enforceability satisﬁes  hh h ∈(,) .
hh > θθ <
θθ >
hh <
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in expectations is sufﬁcient. A crisis can occur whenever each ﬁrm
expects that others will not undertake credit risk, so that there is a rever-
sion to the safe equilibrium. The key to having multiple market-clearing
prices is that part of the N-sector’s demand comes from the N-sector
itself. Thus, when the price falls below a cutoff level and N-sector ﬁrms
go bankrupt, the investment share of the N-sector falls (from φl to φc).
This, in turn, reduces the demand for N-sector goods, validating the fall in
the price. 
We emphasize that the interaction of contract enforceability problems
and systemic guarantees creates the fragility required for self-fulﬁlling
crises to occur. If there were no guarantees, agents would not be willing to
take on credit risk to claim the implicit subsidy, and currency mismatches
would not arise. Costly enforceability of contracts would still imply that
the N-sector can grow only gradually. However, there would be no
endogenous force that makes a boom end in a crisis. Alternatively, if there
were only guarantees but no enforceability problems, neither borrowing
constraints nor balance sheet effects would arise. Thus N-sector invest-
ment would not be constrained by its cash ﬂow. 
GDP Growth and Financial Fragility
We are now ready to rationalize the link between growth and fragility.
Since N-sector goods are intermediate inputs, whereas T-sector goods are
ﬁnal consumption goods, GDP equals the value of N-sector investment
plus T-sector output: GDPt = ptIt + yt.. It then follows from equations A8
through A11 that 
As is evident, the key determinants of growth in GDP are the technologi-
cal coefﬁcient in T-sector production (at) and the share of N-sector output
invested by the N-sector (φt). In order to isolate the effects of ﬁnancial lib-
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and equal to φs. Thus GDP and T-sector output grow at a common rate:
Absent technological progress in the T-sector, N-sector growth is the
force driving growth in both sectors. As the N-sector expands, N-sector
goods become more abundant and cheaper, allowing the T-sector to
expand production. This expansion is possible if and only if N-sector
productivity (θ) and the N-sector investment share (φs) are high enough
so that credit and N-sector output can grow over time: Bt/Bt–1 = qt/qt–1 =
θφs > 1.68
A liberalized economy goes through a succession of lucky paths punc-
tuated by crisis episodes. Since along a lucky path the investment share
equals φl, equation A13 implies that the common growth rate of GDP and
T-sector output is 1 +γ l = (θφl)α. A comparison of γl and equation A14
reveals that, as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a liberalized
economy is faster than in a nonliberalized one. In the presence of systemic
guarantees, credit risk allows ﬁnancially constrained N-sector ﬁrms to
borrow and invest more than in a nonliberalized economy (φl > φs). Since
there are sectoral linkages (α > 0), this increase in the N-sector’s invest-
ment share beneﬁts both the T- and the N-sectors. 
Because self-fulﬁlling crises occur with probability 1 – u, and during a
crisis the investment share falls from φl to φc < φs, the fact that γl > γNL does
not imply that ﬁnancial liberalization leads to faster mean GDP growth.
The reduction in the investment share comes about through two channels:
ﬁrst, N-sector ﬁrms go bankrupt and their cash ﬂow collapses, as captured
by µw/(1 – β); second, leverage falls because ﬁrms cannot take on credit
risk, indexed by (1 – hδ)/(1 – hδu–1). It follows from equation A13 that, in
a crisis episode that lasts two periods, the mean crisis growth rate is 1 +γcr
=θ α(φlφc)α/2. As can be seen, variations in GDP growth generated by real
exchange rate changes at τ and τ+1 cancel out. Thus the average loss in
GDP growth stems only from the fall in the N-sector’s average invest-
ment share. 
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68. The mechanism by which faster growth in the N-sector induces faster growth in the
T-sector is the decline in the relative price of N-sector goods that takes place in a growing
economy. If there were technological progress in the T-sector, there would be a Balassa-
Samuelson effect and the real exchange rate would appreciate over time.
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whether ﬁnancial liberalization will increase long-run growth, we com-
pute the limit distribution of the growth rate of GDP. Using the expres-
sions for γl and γcr, it follows that over the long run the mean compounded
growth rate of GDP in a liberalized economy is69
Notice that ω is the proportion of time that the economy is on a lucky path
over the long run. A comparison of long-run GDP growth rates in equa-
tions A14 and A15 reveals the following result. 
Result 3. Average long-run GDP growth is greater in a liberalized econ-
omy than in a nonliberalized economy, provided contract enforceability
problems are severe, but not too severe [h ∈ (h*, h**)], and ﬁnancial dis-
tress during crises is not too great 
The relationship between ﬁnancial liberalization and growth is not
straightforward because an increase in the probability of crisis (1 – u) has
ambiguous effects on long-run growth. One the one hand, a greater 1 – u
increases investment and growth along the lucky path by increasing the
subsidy implicit in the guarantee and allowing N-sector ﬁrms to be more
leveraged. On the other hand, a greater 1 – u also makes crises more fre-
quent. The degree of contract enforceability h plays a key role. If we
increase 1 – u, the growth-enhancing effect of more investment dominates
the growth-reducing effect of more frequent crises when h is large
enough. This happens because a large h increases ﬁrms’ leverage and
allows them to reap the beneﬁts of risk taking. However, h cannot be arbi-
trarily large to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. If h were very
large, borrowing constraints would not arise (by equation A6), or markets
would not clear, as φl > 1 (by equation A12).70
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69. For the computation of the limit distribution see Ranciere, Tornell, and Wester-
mann (2003).
70. A higher long-run growth rate comes at the cost of a higher incidence of crises. A
natural question is thus whether faster growth is associated with greater social welfare.
Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) show that if T-sector agents have access to
complete capital markets, so that they can hedge real exchange rate risk, then welfare in a 
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low, underlies the importance of the country sample over which the
empirical link between liberalization and growth exists. The above result
implies that, among the set of countries where contract enforceability
problems are severe, but not too severe, ﬁnancial liberalization may lead
to more rapid growth even if one controls for trade liberalization. This
prediction establishes a causal link from liberalization to GDP growth in
the earlier regressions. 
Credit Growth 
Here we show that economies that have followed growth-enhancing
risky credit paths are identiﬁed by a negatively skewed distribution of
credit growth. Since in the model N-sector ﬁrms use only N-sector inputs,
the appropriate measure of real credit is ˜ bt = (bt + bt
n)/pt. It follows from
equations A5 and A6 that, in a risky and in a safe economy, real credit is
given, respectively, by
In a safe, nonliberalized economy, credit follows a smooth path, whereas
in a risky, liberalized economy it follows a bumpy path. Using equation
A9, we have that in the latter the compounded growth rate of credit is
ζl = log(θφl) along a lucky path, ζc = log{θφlu (µw/1 – β)[(1 – hδu–1)/ 
(1 – hδ)]} during a crisis, and ζp = log[θφl(1/u)] in the postcrisis period. 
When skewness is negative, the good outcomes in the distribution lie
closer to the mean than the bad outcomes. We ﬁnd this credit pattern in
the risky equilibrium because N-sector ﬁrms face endogenous borrowing
constraints, so that N-sector credit is constrained by cash ﬂow. Along the
lucky path on which no crises occur, cash ﬂow accumulates gradually,
and credit can grow only gradually. In contrast, when a crisis erupts, there
are widespread bankruptcies and cash ﬂow collapses. Thus credit growth
falls sharply (ζc <ζ l). In the wake of a crisis, credit growth rebounds
before returning to its lucky level (ζp >ζ l). As long as crises are rare
events, the credit growth rates during the postcrisis period and the lucky
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risky equilibrium is greater than in a safe equilibrium provided enforceability problems are
severe enough.
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with the same frequency, the distribution of credit growth is characterized
by negative outliers in a long enough sample. That is: 
Result 4. In a risky, liberalized economy the limit distribution of credit
growth has negative skewness. Meanwhile in a nonliberalized economy
credit growth has a smooth path with zero skewness.
To link this result to our empirical ﬁndings, recall that a risky equilib-
rium exists only if enforceability problems are severe but not too severe,
conditions that we ﬁnd in MECs. Thus the ﬁrst implication of this result is
that ﬁnancial liberalization may lead to bumpiness of credit growth across
MECs. Since negative skewness of credit growth reﬂects the adoption of
credit risk, which eases ﬁnancial constraints and leads to an increase in
mean GDP growth (according to result 3), the second implication is that
negative skewness is an appropriate right-hand-side variable in the
growth regressions we estimate. 
Notice that if enforceability problems were either not severe or too
severe, there would be no endogenous force that would make credit
growth negatively skewed to begin with. Thus the link between negative
skewness and growth would not exist.
In the model, credit growth exhibits more variance in the liberalized
economy. Empirically, however, variance is not a good means of identify-
ing economies that have followed growth-enhancing, risky credit paths
that lead to infrequent crises. High variance may also reﬂect high-
frequency shocks, which might be exogenous or might be self-inﬂicted
by, for instance, a procyclical ﬁscal policy. To generate high variance in
both the safe and the risky equilibria, one could include in the model high-
frequency exogenous shocks that do not lead to crises. Such shocks would
increase the variance of credit growth in both economies but would not
increase mean GDP growth. The two equilibria would still be distin-
guished by negative skewness of credit growth, because only the risky
equilibrium would be crisis prone.
The N-to-T Output Ratio
We have captured the sectoral asymmetry in ﬁnancing opportunities
prevalent in MECs by assuming that T-sector production is not affected
80 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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ity problems. This sectoral asymmetry generates two predictions about
the behavior of the N-to-T output ratio that help us identify the mecha-
nism that links liberalization, fragility, and growth in MECs. 
Because the N-sector is more ﬁnancially constrained than the T-sector,
the ﬁrst prediction is that, along any equilibrium path, the N-to-T output
ratio is positively correlated with domestic credit. To derive the second
prediction, note that it follows from equations A10 and A11 that, in a
symmetric equilibrium, the N-to-T ratio is given by 
The investment equations A5 and A6 imply that when there is a shift from
a nonliberalized to a liberalized economy, the N-to-T output ratio
increases from α/(1 – φs) to α/(1 – φl). This reﬂects the fact that ﬁnancial
liberalization eases ﬁnancial constraints and allows the N-sector to com-
mand a greater share of N-sector inputs.71
If a crisis occurs at some date τ, there is a ﬁre sale: a steep real depre-
ciation occurs, and because of currency mismatch, all N-sector ﬁrms
default. As a result, the investment share falls from φl to φc. The price of
N-sector goods must then fall to allow the T-sector to absorb a greater
share of N-sector output, which is predetermined by investment at τ – 1.
As can be seen in equation A17, the N-to-T ratio falls from α/(1 – φl) to
α/(1 – φc). Thus: 
Result 5. Across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio responds positively to
ﬁnancial liberalization and negatively to crises and is positively corre-
lated with credit growth.
Both of these implications of sectoral asymmetries are consistent with our
empirical ﬁndings. Furthermore, sectoral asymmetries are key to explain-
ing several features of the boom-bust cycles experienced by many MECs,
as well as Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth and recent export slowdown. 
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71. We have set at to a constant. However, one can verify that an increase in at follow-
ing trade liberalization reduces the N-to-T output ratio.
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Construction of Indexes, Data Sources,
and Robustness Analysis
Here we explain how we construct our liberalization indexes and the
N-to-T output ratio, describe the data sets we used, and present results of
some robustness tests.
Liberalization Indexes
Our de facto trade and ﬁnancial liberalization indexes indicate the year
when a given country liberalized. We construct the indexes by looking for
trend breaks in trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. We identify trend breaks by
applying the CUSUM test of Brown and others (1975) to the time trend of
the data. This method tests for parameter stability based on the cumula-
tive sum of recursive residuals.72
A MEC is trade liberalized (TL) at year t if its trade-to-GDP ratio
either has a trend break at or before t or has exceeded 30 percent at or
before t. The 30 percent criterion identiﬁes countries where trade was lib-
eralized at the beginning of our sample (1980) or where the increase in
trade ﬂows did not take place from one year to the next, but instead took
place over a few years.73
To determine the date of ﬁnancial liberalization, we consider net
cumulative capital inﬂows (KI).74 A country is ﬁnancially liberalized (FL)
at year t if KI has a trend break at or before t and there is at least one year
with a KI-to-GDP ratio greater than 5 percent at or before t, or if its KI-to-
GDP ratio is greater than 10 percent at or before t, or if the country is
associated with the European Union. The 5 and 10 percent thresholds
82 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
72. All HECs have liberalized trade and ﬁnancial markets through the whole sample
period.
73. We compute the trade-to-GDP ratio as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP,
using data from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
74. We compute cumulative net capital inﬂows sent by nonresidents since 1980. Capi-
tal inﬂows include FDI, portfolio ﬂows, and bank ﬂows. The data series are from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, lines 78BUDZF, 78BGDZF,
and 78BEDZ. For some countries not all three series are available for all years. In that case
we use inﬂows to the banking system only, a measure that is available for all country-years.
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reduce the possibility of false liberalization and false nonliberalization
signals, respectively. Table B1 lists the liberalization dates.
To determine the trend breaks, we regress each KI series on a constant
and a time trend. The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of
residuals of this regression. The test signals parameter instability of the
time trend if the cumulative sum exits the area between the two critical
lines. The test is based on the following statistic: 
where wr is the recursive residual and s is the standard error of the
regression fitted to all T-sample points. If the coefficient on the time
trend remains constant from period to period, E(Wt)  = 0. But if it
changes, Wt will tend to diverge from the zero mean value line. The sig-
nificance of any departure from the zero line is assessed by reference to
a pair of 5 percent significance lines. The distance between them
increases with t. The 5 percent signiﬁcance lines are found by connecting
the points k ± 0.948(T – k)1/2 and T ± 3 × 0.948(T – k)1/2. A crossing of the
critical lines by Wt signals coefﬁcient instability.75
When the cumulative sum of residuals starts to deviate from zero, it
may take a few years until this deviation becomes statistically signiﬁcant.
To account for the delay problem, we choose the year in which the cumu-
lative sum of residuals deviates from zero, provided that it eventually
crosses the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. In the case of Mexico, parameter
instability begins in the fourth quarter of 1989 and becomes statistically
signiﬁcant after the fourth quarter of 1991.
Three comments are in order. First, our TL and FL indexes do not
allow for policy reversals: once a country liberalizes, it never becomes
closed thereafter. This means that our indexes do not capture some policy
reversals that might have occurred in the latter part of the 1990s. Since
our sample period is 1980–99, we consider our approach to be the correct
one for analyzing the effects of liberalization on long-run growth and
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75. The underlying assumption is that the time series is trend stationary before the
structural break. This is conﬁrmed for the case of Mexico by unit root tests. The unit root
tests are estimated with a constant, a time trend, and a number of lags (2) determined by the
Schwarz information criterion. Before liberalization the series is trend stationary. Including
the postliberalization period, it has a unit root and is difference stationary.
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Table B1. Dates of Financial and Trade Liberalization 
and Sectors Used in N-to-T Output Ratiosa
Sectors designated tradable 
and nontradable 
for regressions including
the N-to-T output ratiob
Date of ﬁnancial Date of trade  Based on  Based on real
Country liberalization liberalization export shares exchange rates
Argentina 1991 1986 C, M C, M
Bangladesh Never Never S, M S, M
Belgium Always Always C, M C, M
Brazil 1992 1988 S, M S, M
Chile Always Always C, M C, M
Colombia 1991 1992 S, M S, M
Egypt Always 1991 S, M S, M
Greece Always 1986 S, M S, M
Hong Kong Always Always NA NA
Hungary 1994 1994 S, M S, M
India Never 1994 S, M S, M
Indonesia
c 1989 1987 S, M S, M
Ireland Always Always NA NA
Israel 1990 1986 NA NA
Jordan 1989 Always S, M S, M
Korea 1985 Always C, M C, M
Malaysia Always Always C, M C, M
Mexico 1989 1988 C, M C, M
Morocco Never 1986 S, M S, M
Pakistan Never Never S, M S, M
Peru 1992 1987 M, S S, M
Philippines 1989 1986 C, M C, M
Poland Never 1993 NA S, M
Portugal 1986 1986 C, M C, M
South Africa 1994 Never S, M S, M
Spain Always 1984 S, M S, M
Sri Lanka Never 1989 S, M S, M
Thailand 1988 1986 C, M C, M
Tunisia Never Always M, S S, M
Turkey Always 1994 C, S C, M
Uruguay 1989 1988 NA NA
Venezuela Never Always S, M S, M
Zimbabwe Never Never S, M S, M
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. “Always” indicates that the country has been open at least since 1980; “Never” indicates that the country was closed at least
until 1999.
b. The ﬁrst of each pair is the sector designated as nontradable, and the second is that designated as tradable; C, construction;
M, manufacturing; S, services.
c. The sample does not cover the period before 1993; the ﬁnancial liberalization date is therefore set to 1989, which ﬁts the
dates of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001).
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nient to distinguish liberalization  from  openness  indexes. The former
identify the dates of ﬁnancial liberalization, whereas the latter measure
the amount of capital ﬂows that a country receives over a certain period.
For instance, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) and Kaminski and
Schmukler (2002) consider liberalization  indexes as we do, whereas
Kraay (1999), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), and Edison and others
(2002) consider openness indexes. Finally, the country-years identiﬁed as
ﬁnancially liberalized by our index, as well as the other liberalization
indexes, do not necessarily coincide with “good times,” because they
include both boom and bust country-years. Therefore they are not subject
to the criticism that liberalized country-years coincide with good times. 
The N-to-T Output Ratio
We construct the N-to-T output ratio by proxying N-sector and T-sector
production with data for construction, manufacturing, and services. In the
text of the paper we use the sectoral exports-to-GDP ratio as the criterion
for classifying the N- and T-sectors. Construction is never classiﬁed as a
T-sector. Meanwhile the classiﬁcation of services and manufacturing
varies from country to country. Since the price of N-sector goods tracks
international prices less closely than that of T-sector goods, we construct
an alternative index in which we classify as nontradable the sectors in
which the sectoral real exchange rate varies the most, and as tradable the
sectors in which it varies the least. Table B1 reports both indexes. The
correlation between them is 0.745. Table B2 shows that the regression
results reported in table 4 are robust to the choice of index.
Mexican Manufacturing Sector Data Set
The data used to test for the presence of bottlenecks come from the
Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial Annual) of the National
Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza Martínez 85
76. If, after liberalization, a country suffers a sharp reversal in capital ﬂows (such as in
a ﬁnancial crisis), it might exhibit a second breakpoint. In our sample, however, this possi-
bility is not present: the trend breaks due to crises are never large enough to show up in sig-
niﬁcant CUSUM test statistics.
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sample contained 5,934 ﬁrms and covered more than 80 percent of manu-
facturing value added, 35 percent of employment, and 84 percent of sales
in the manufacturing sector. The unit of observation is the manufacturing
establishment. However, for conﬁdentiality reasons we received the infor-
mation at a ﬁve-digit aggregation level. To compute the share of N-sector
inputs we consider the following as N-sector expenses: maintenance and
repair services, outsourcing services, rents and leasing, transport, public-
ity, and electricity. The other expenses used to calculate total variable
costs include labor costs, materials, technology transfers, commissions
for sales, combustibles, and other expenses.
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Table B2. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetriesa
Independent variable B2-1 B2-2 B2-3
Financial liberalization 1.129** 0.979** 0.996**
(0.142) (0.149) (0.141)




Rate of real depreciation 2.260*
(1.374)
Crisis year dummy –0.021* –0.019* 0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Crisis year +1 –2.444** –2.134** –2.240**
(0.144) (0.184) (0.178)
Crisis year +2 0.207* 0.447** 0.375**
(0.128) (0.155) (0.147)
Crisis year +3 –0.784** –0.648** –0.690**
(0.128) (0.130) (0.122)
Crisis year +4 –0.478** –0.236 0.341*
(0.194) (0.204) (0.194)
Crisis year +5 0.856** 0.827** 0.911**
(0.184) (0.163) (0.155)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.691 0.728 0.745
No. of observations 443 426 371
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the N-to-T out-
put ratio based on the variance of the sectoral real exchange rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates signiﬁ-
cance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level.
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The stock market data set is derived from the information contained in
the ﬁnancial statements of ﬁrms listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.
It is an unbalanced panel of 310 ﬁrms, excluding ﬁnancial ﬁrms, of which
only 64 are present for the whole sample period. We have yearly observa-
tions from 1990 to 2000. All the variables are measured at the end of the
year and are deﬂated by the December consumer price index. The vari-
ables used in the text are constructed as in the following table.
Variable Deﬁnition
Issuance Total value of equity plus long-term bonds issued domestically and
internationally. Long-term bonds are those with maturities of one
year or longer. Issuances are normalized with the sum of long-term
liabilities plus the stock outstanding.
Entries/listed ﬁrms Number of new ﬁrms or ﬁrms issuing initial public offerings
divided by the total number of listed ﬁrms
Exits/listed ﬁrms Number of ﬁrms de-listing divided by the total number of listed
ﬁrms
Foreign liabilities/ Liabilities denominated in foreign currency, divided by total 
total liabilities liabilities
Capital stock Fixed assets, including real estate, machinery, and equipment
Investment Change in ﬁxed assets from year t – 1 to year t
Cash ﬂow Total sales minus operating expenses
Change in sales Change in total sales from year t – 1 to year t
Mexican Economic Census
The economic census covers the whole Mexican economy and is avail-
able at ﬁve-year intervals from INEGI. The information at the establish-
ment level is conﬁdential. Thus each observation corresponds to a group
of establishments with a similar number of employees, in the same eco-
nomic activity (six-digit classiﬁcation) and in the same geographical
region (municipality).77 The number of establishments is omitted for some
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77. Within each six-digit class and each municipality, establishments were grouped
according to the following stratiﬁcation: 0–2 employees, 3–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–30,
31–50, 51–100, 101–250, 251–500, 501–1,000, and 1,001 or more.
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Table B3. Robustness Tests
Independent variable B3-1a B3-2b B3-3c B3-4d B3-5e
Regressions of growth 
on liberalizationf
Financial liberalization 2.980** 3.036** 1.571** 2.686** 2.467**
(0.363) (0.668) (0.181) (0.132) (0.119)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.615 0.953 0.547 0.568
No. of observations 423 423 460 450 450
Regressions of growth 
on bumpiness measuresg
Mean of real credit  0.051** 0.130** 0.065** 0.123** 0.127**
growth rate (0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Standard deviation of   –0.027** –0.030** –0.001 –0.027** –0.032**
real credit growth rate (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Negative skewness of  0.354** 0.212** 0.066** 0.207** 0.216**
real credit growth rate (0.071) (0.097) (0.025) (0.036) (0.037)
Summary statistics:
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.619 0.901 0.562 0.630
No. of observations 383 383 424 414 414
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using the legal origin index of La Porta and others
(1999) as an instrument. All regressions include the combined MEC and HEC sample of countries. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using lagged values as instruments.
c. Regression estimated by the generalized least squares method allowing for ﬁxed effects.
d. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out China.
e. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out Ireland.
f. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 1-3 of table 1 in the text.
g. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 3-2 of table 3 in the text.
observations. In such cases an average of the number of establishments by
group is used in order to weight each. There are 286,866 observations in
1994 and 400,120 in 1999.
Robustness Tests
Table B3 shows results of tests of the robustness of the benchmark
regressions in columns 1-3 and 3-2 in tables 1 and 3, respectively.
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Discussion
Timothy J. Kehoe: Aaron Tornell, Frank Westermann, and Lorenza
Martínez have written an excellent paper that deals with important issues
and that has caused me to reexamine my own thinking on these issues.
The authors attempt to answer the question, Why has Mexico experienced
less-than-spectacular growth since its apertura,  or opening to foreign
trade and investment, in the late 1980s? I agree with much of what this
paper has to say: Those of us who would gladly teach that free trade and
open capital markets are the best policies for developing economies to
follow have a challenging task in accounting for the ambiguous evidence
on that score from some countries over the past decade or so. 
What are the major points in this paper with which I agree?
—Mexico’s economic performance following its apertura, although
good compared with that over the period 1982–88, is disappointing com-
pared with what policymakers and proponents of free trade and capital
ﬂows had expected. 
—It is important to identify the feature or features of Mexico’s open-
ness policies that have been responsible for retarding economic growth
since 1988. Circumstantial evidence on the performance of the Mexican
domestic ﬁnancial system—in particular that of commercial banks—iden-
tiﬁes poorly designed reform of the banking system as a likely culprit. 
—Data on both output levels and relative prices indicate that a key
ingredient in any successful theory of what has happened in Mexico since
1988 will be a mechanism that accounts for the ups and downs of the non-
tradables sector relative to the tradables sector.
—Ultimately, to account for the growth, or lack of it, in Mexico and in
other countries that have undergone similar experiences with trade and
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tivity and sources of ﬁnancing at the ﬁrm or plant level.
The bulk of the authors’ analysis relies on regressions run on cross-
country data for the period 1980–99. Raphael Bergoeing, Patrick Kehoe,
Raimundo Soto, and I (BKKS) have studied the determinants of Mexican
economic performance since 1980 by focusing on the contrast between
the experience of Mexico and that of Chile.1 BKKS’s analysis produces
many conclusions that echo those of the present authors. I will highlight
here these areas of agreement, but I will also emphasize the areas of dis-
agreement. In particular, the contrast between Mexico and Chile and the
timing of events in Mexico cast some doubt on the authors’ conclusion
that the source of Mexico’s disappointing growth performance has been
that producers of nontradables were starved of investment funds after the
1995 crisis. 
Before exploring the contrast between Mexico and Chile, I want to
stress how much more important it is to study economic ﬂuctuations in a
country like Mexico than it is to study economic ﬂuctuations in a country
like the United States. Figure 1 compares aggregate economic perfor-
mance in Mexico over the period 1920–2002 with that of the United
States.2 Notice that, apart from the period of the Great Depression and
World War II, the path of real GDP per working-age (sixteen to sixty-four
years old) person in the United States closely follows a 2 percent growth
trend. Business cycle ﬂuctuations in the United States since World War II
have been relatively trivial. In contrast, economic ﬂuctuations in Mexico
since 1980 are closer in magnitude to those of the 1930s and 1940s in the
United States than they are to what we in this country now call the busi-
ness cycle. 
great depressions in chile and mexico. BKKS examine the eco-
nomic crises that occurred in Chile and Mexico in the early 1980s and
their aftermaths using the Great Depressions methodology developed by
Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian and by Edward Prescott and myself.3 This
methodology uses growth accounting and simple calibrated dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium models to examine alternative explanations for large eco-
nomic ﬂuctuations like that of the Great Depression in the United States.
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1. Bergoeing and others (2002).
2. The data used here are taken from Bergoeing and others (2002) and updated to 2002.
These data are available at www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe/. 
3. Cole and Ohanian (1999); Kehoe and Prescott (2002).
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Figure 1. Real GDP per Person of Working Age, United States and Mexico,
1920–2002a
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis; National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and
Informatics; Maddison (1995); the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics; and the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators.
a. Persons aged sixteen to sixty-four.
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severe economic crises in the early 1980s. Their recovery paths after the
crisis differed markedly, however. In Chile, output per working-age per-
son has grown at an annual average rate of 4.0 percent during 1983–2002.
In Mexico, in contrast, output per working-age person has grown at an
annual average rate of 0.6 percent during 1988–2002. Figure 2 shows that
Mexico has lost more than 30 percent of output per working-age person
with respect to the 2 percent growth trend since the early 1980s.
BKKS’s striking ﬁnding is that the main determinants of the depres-
sions in Chile and Mexico were not the drops in inputs of capital and
labor that traditional theories of depressions stress, but rather drops in the
efﬁciency with which these inputs are used, measured as total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP). Figure 3 presents data on TFP in Chile and Mexico over
the period 1980–2002. Exogenous shocks like the deteriorations in the
terms of trade and the increases in foreign interest rates that buffeted
Chile and Mexico in the early 1980s can cause a decline in economic
activity of the magnitude usually observed over a business cycle. BKKS
argue that it was mistaken government policy that turned this sort of a
92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Figure 2. Real GDP per Person of Working Age in Mexico and in Chile, Detrended,
1980–2002a
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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trend that constitutes a depression. In both Chile and Mexico the mistaken
government policy involved the domestic banking system. Rather than
focus on the causes of the depressions in Chile and Mexico, however,
BKKS concentrate their attention on why the subsequent growth experi-
ences in these two countries were so different.
Comparing data from Chile and Mexico allows BKKS to reject two
popular explanations of the economic performances of these two coun-
tries as explanations for the difference: The ﬁrst is Vittorio Corbo and
Stanley Fischer’s hypothesis that Chile’s rapid recovery was driven by
export growth;4 the second is Jeffrey Sachs’s hypothesis that Mexico’s
stagnation was due to a large external debt overhang that discouraged new
investment.5 On the one hand, the top panel of ﬁgure 4 shows that, during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, exports actually grew much faster in Mex-
ico than in Chile, yet Chile grew while Mexico stagnated. On the other
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4. Corbo and Fischer (1994).
5. Sachs (1989).
Figure 3. Total Factor Productivity in Mexico and in Chile, 1980–2002
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Main Economic Indicators; Penn World Table 5.6, the Universidad de
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Figure 4. Exports and External Debt in Chile and Mexico, 1980–2002
Sources: Author’s calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the World Trade Organization’s International
Trade Statistics 2000.























1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 94hand, the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4 shows that Chile’s ratio of external debt
to GDP was much higher than Mexico’s through the 1980s, and growth
accounting shows that Mexico’s stagnation was not caused by the lack of
new investment.
BKKS’s alternative explanation for the difference in economic perfor-
mance between Chile and Mexico is based on the different timing of
structural reforms in the two countries. In the 1970s and early 1980s,
Chile privatized extensively and undertook reforms in trade policy, ﬁscal
policy, banking, and bankruptcy law, thus setting the stage for the coun-
try’s successful performance of the late 1980s and 1990s. Mexico, in con-
trast, postponed these reforms and stagnated. BKKS use numerical
experiments with a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to
argue that the only reforms that can explain the difference in economic
performance are those whose effects show up primarily as differences in
productivity, not those that show up as differences in factor inputs. This
result rules out ﬁscal reforms, which primarily affect the incentives to
accumulate capital and to work. Moreover, the timing is not right for ﬁs-
cal reforms as an explanation: both Chile and Mexico reformed their tax
systems in the mid-1980s, and these reforms had similar impacts on
investment; hence these reforms cannot account for the different paths.
Like the present authors, BKKS identify the lack of reform in the domes-
tic ﬁnancial system as the likely culprit in Mexico’s lack of growth. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the trajectory of private credit was substantially lower in
Mexico than in Chile.
The matter of timing is crucial. BKKS argue that reforms in trade pol-
icy and privatization were less important than those in banking and bank-
ruptcy law, precisely because Chile had already reaped most of the
beneﬁts of these reforms, whereas Mexico was starting to reap them pre-
cisely when Mexico was stagnating and Chile was growing. BKKS con-
clude that the crucial difference between Chile and Mexico is that Chile
was willing to pay the costs of reforming its banking system and of letting
inefﬁcient ﬁrms go bankrupt, and Mexico was not. 
How does BKKS’s analysis compare with that of Tornell, Wester-
mann, and Martínez? Much of the relationship is complementary.
BKKS’s growth accounting shows that any successful theory of Mexico’s
lack of growth needs to work through low TFP growth, not through low
levels of investment or employment. The explanation of Tornell and
coauthors would be that it is not that levels of investment were low after
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led to this investment being misallocated to the tradables sector rather
than to the nontradables sector. Furthermore, in their model, the lack of
output of nontradables starved the tradables sector of intermediate inputs,
resulting in lower productivity there as well. 
BKKS also conclude, as do the present authors, that problems with
contract enforcement in Mexico have contributed to low productivity.
Once again it is important to remember that growth accounting indicates
that Mexico’s problem is not lack of aggregate investment: it is not that
lack of enforcement has led to lower investment, but rather that lack of
enforcement has led to investment being allocated inefﬁciently. A prob-
lem with this sort of hypothesis is the lack of data to prove or disprove it.
The present authors do the best they can with data on imputed tax evasion
and criminal arrests for theft. Studying Chile and Mexico, BKKS use data
on business bankruptcies in Chile from that country’s Fiscalía Nacional
de Quiebras (National Attorney’s Ofﬁce for Bankruptcies) in the Ministry
of Justice. It is telling that no such agency existed in Mexico before the
bankruptcy reform in 2000, so that no such data existed. The impact of
contract enforcement problems on economic growth and industrial orga-
96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
Figure 5. Private Credit in Chile and Mexico, 1980–2002
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and the
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shows that inadequacies in contract enforcement can account for most of
the differences in the distribution of ﬁrm size, and a large part of the dif-
ference in incomes, among Mexico, the United States, and Argentina.6
some doubts. The data depicted in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 high-
light the contrast between Mexican growth during 1950–81 and growth
since then. The authors’ analysis, in contrast, stresses the comparison
before and after Mexico’s opening in the late 1980s. Over the period
1988–2002, growth in real GDP per working-age person averaged
0.6 percent a year, a substantial improvement over the 3.0 percent average
annual decline over the period 1981–88. Notice, however, that growth by
this measure since 1988 comes nowhere near the average of 3.5 percent a
year recorded over the period 1950–81. The sort of import substitution
policy that Mexico followed during that period has fallen into such disre-
pute among both academic economists and policymakers that we often
forget that Mexico did extraordinarily well as a closed economy up until
1981. One can argue (as I would) that the crisis of 1982–88 demonstrated
that import substitution in Mexico was ultimately doomed to fail.
Nonetheless, ﬁgure 1 suggests that the authors’ decision to use data from
1980–99 is crucial in obtaining the favorable effects for openness in their
growth regressions. Had their data included observations from the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s, when such closed economies as Brazil and Mexico
grew spectacularly, I suspect that their results would have been signiﬁ-
cantly different. 
Concentrating on the authors’ contrast of the period 1988–94 with the
period 1995–2002, I ﬁnd that my doubts revolve around timing. Accord-
ing to the authors, nontradables-producing ﬁrms were ﬁnancially con-
strained during 1995–2002, but not during 1988–94. Notice, however,
that the data in my ﬁgures 1 and 2 show that Mexico grew much faster
during the period when ﬁrms were ﬁnancially constrained than it did dur-
ing the period when they were not. Real GDP per working-age person
grew by only 0.9 percent a year from 1988 to 1994. From 1995 to 2002 it
grew by 1.8 percent a year, and it grew at an even faster rate—3.3 percent
a year—if 2001 and 2002 are omitted. The authors suggest that “ﬁre
sales” on the part of ﬁnancially constrained Mexican ﬁrms can account
for the initially rapid growth after the 1995 crisis, and that the 2001–02
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but I have my doubts. For example, my ﬁgure 5 shows that private credit
in Chile fell sharply over the period 1984–91, yet ﬁgure 2 shows that
Chile grew spectacularly during this period and afterward. Furthermore,
the authors’ story cannot account for Mexico’s disappointing growth
experience over the period 1988–94, when firms were not financially
constrained. 
To be convinced by the authors’ hypothesis on why growth was disap-
pointing in Mexico, I would want to see a calibrated version of their
model that gets right not only the magnitudes of the changes in the impor-
tant variables, but also the timing of these changes. Can the authors con-
struct a model in which the problems in the banking system show up
primarily as a misallocation of investment rather than as an underprovi-
sion of investment? Can the observed drop in TFP be driven by a misallo-
cation of resources across the tradables and nontradables sectors that is
consistent with the observed changes in relative prices? Can their model
reconcile the lack of correlation of movements in TFP (ﬁgure 3) with the
movements in private credit (ﬁgure 5)?
A conclusive conﬁrmation or refutation of the authors’ hypothesis will
ultimately require more research based on microlevel data. I have some
doubts about the mechanism that the authors posit as leading from lack of
ﬁnancing in the nontradables sector to lower productivity in the tradables
sector: Mexican input-output data show that the nontradables sector is
even more dependent on the tradables sector for intermediate inputs than
vice versa. If tradables sector ﬁrms had free access to ﬁnancing, why did
they not develop in-house ways of obtaining the sorts of maintenance,
repair, and transportation services cited by the authors as essential non-
tradable inputs into tradables production?
The authors’ pessimistic view of Mexico’s prospects depends crucially
on data since 2000. The drop in Mexico’s exports in 2001 and 2002
depicted in ﬁgure 4 is indeed alarming after a decade and a half of explo-
sive growth. It is also undoubtedly true that Mexico still has a way to go
in reforming and modernizing its economy. The political gridlock that is
occurring during President Vicente Fox’s term of ofﬁce (2000–2006) is
not helping to advance reform. Nonetheless, the authors’ analysis leaves a
lot unanswered: Why has the entry of foreign banks into the Mexican
ﬁnancial system not led to more efﬁcient ﬁnancing of domestic ﬁrms?
Why has the bankruptcy reform of 2000 not solved the sorts of contract
98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
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appreciation in Mexico over 1995–2000 accounts for the later slowdown
in growth and drop in exports, why does the real depreciation over the
period 2001–02 (and 2003) not presage a resurgence in growth? 
The data in ﬁgure 1 are a reminder of how minor a part of Mexico’s
growth experience is the experience of 2001–02. The question is whether
the 2001–02 downturn signals a longer-term trend, or whether it will be
quickly reversed. It may be that the drop in growth and in exports over the
period 2001–02 is more a reﬂection of the collapse of manufacturing in
the United States and of increased competition from countries like China
than it is of the ﬁnancial problems that are the authors’ focus. Things
could turn around sharply going forward. Only time, and more analysis,
will tell.
Alejandro Werner: Tornell, Westermann, and Martínez have produced
an important paper on the relationship among ﬁnancial liberalization,
ﬁnancial crises, and economic growth. It is a signiﬁcant contribution to
the literature on this topic. One of its principal conclusions is that ﬁnan-
cial liberalization has been good for developing countries. This result
holds despite the negative effects of ﬁnancial crisis on growth and is very
well established in the paper.
The paper explores the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth,
paying special attention to two issues. The ﬁrst is the impact of liberaliza-
tion on the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis occurring, and the second is the
asymmetric response of the nontradables and the tradables sectors as a
fundamental transmission mechanism from ﬁnancial liberalization to
growth and crises.
The authors propose an interesting model for studying the mechanisms
through which ﬁnancial crises develop after ﬁnancial liberalization and
the problems these economies face after such crises. Some of these prob-
lems are related to the negative effects of a crisis on the growth of the
nontradables sector. Although I think these arguments are plausible, the
evidence presented for them in the paper is not as strong as that regarding
the effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth.
When the paper discusses the case of Mexico, the exercise becomes
more difﬁcult as the authors try to ﬁt their speciﬁc theory to the case of
only one country. The narrower focus makes it clear that the crisis-
recovery cycle has many angles and that a single model is not enough to
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those of the authors. 
the model. I have three points to make regarding the model. First, the
model is based on a contract enforceability problem in local credit mar-
kets that drives investment in the nontradables sector below the optimal
level. The implicit assumption is that tradable goods producers can bor-
row in foreign countries and therefore are not subject to this distortion.
However, it is not clear in the model how these ﬁrms can bypass the con-
tract enforceability problem. If a foreign lender must go to the creditor’s
domestic courts to oblige the creditor to pay, the lender faces the same
contract enforceability problem that the local ﬁnancial system faces. The
authors should have good arguments to sustain this assumption, through
either reputational effects, the existence of international pledgeable col-
lateral, or legally binding provisions in free trade agreements. Many free
trade agreements in fact contain clauses that allow the interested parties in
a contract to bypass domestic courts. 
The second point is that, in the model, ﬁnancial liberalization brings
about bailouts and the possibility of risk-enhancing foreign currency bor-
rowing. Borrowing in foreign currency is the mechanism through which
ﬁnancing costs are brought down. Therefore the mechanism for lowering
ﬁnancing costs is a bailout that is conditional on a crisis happening and
having borrowed in foreign currency. This is a very narrow view of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization. If this were the only effect of ﬁnancial liberalization,
any rational government would prefer to give ﬁrms a direct subsidy and
maintain restrictions on borrowing in foreign currency. This would cor-
rect the undesirable effects of the enforceability problem on investment
without generating the problem of excessive risk. Implicitly, then, there
must be additional reasons, not incorporated in the model, that drive a
government to allow foreign currency borrowing from the rest of the
world.
My ﬁnal point about the model is that although it generates the result
that, even with the occurrence of crises, growth is more rapid with ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, it would be nice to see some welfare implications of
that conclusion. The effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on welfare for the
representative agent is not clear. Although growth is increasing, thus
improving welfare, the variance of that growth is also on the rise, thus
decreasing welfare. One can take this a bit further: crises generate signiﬁ-
cant problems that are subject to hysteresis effects, driving some eco-
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that crises have on poverty and crime, and eventually on politics, could
seriously threaten future macroeconomic outcomes. The authors’ ﬁgure
16 shows that tax evasion and crime remained at very high levels in Mex-
ico, even after the 1994–95 crisis had passed and the economy started
growing again. These are issues that might be explored in future research.
empirical results. One of the paper’s empirical results is that ﬁnan-
cial liberalization creates ﬁnancial crises and that ﬁnancial fragility, or
“bumpiness,” as the authors call it, is associated with faster growth only
through its positive correlation with ﬁnancial liberalization. The measure
of fragility they use—the skewness of real credit growth—is a bit confus-
ing, however: it does not, as the reader might think, capture the probabil-
ity of a crisis developing, but rather identiﬁes the occurrence of a crisis. 
Another point is that skewness could be capturing any nonlinear effect
of all the other moments of the credit growth distribution. To some
extent, we do not know whether skewness may be capturing a nonlinear
effect of credit growth, because those countries that have had the highest
rate of growth of credit may have exhibited skewness. Therefore some
robustness test of the effect of skewness on growth should be tried in the
regression.
A third point is that the endogeneity of the credit moments and their
covariance with the error term in the equation could be biasing the results.
The model presented to justify why skewness was exogenous fails the
simplicity criteria outlined by Jeffrey Frankel, in his comment on the
paper by Bosworth and Collins in this volume, in the sense that the more
complicated the arguments get, the harder it is to sustain the claim that
these are two exogenous variables. Also, given that the authors are taking
ten-year averages, it seems hard to believe that this problem can be solved
simply by lagging these variables.
In addition, the paper presents the result that ﬁnancial liberalization
and credit are positively correlated with the ratio of nontradable to trad-
able output and that crises are negatively correlated with this ratio. This is
interpreted as evidence in favor of the transmission mechanism in which
the relaxation of credit constraints in the nontradables sector is the driving
force of the model. However, I think all three of these variables—ﬁnan-
cial liberalization, credit, and the timing of the crisis—are basically con-
structed from capital ﬂows into the country. Therefore this correlation
could also be explained by several theories in which, when large capital
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sector. This could happen, for example, because the investment equation
(or the demand for investment) is more elastic in the nontradables than in
the tradables sector, or by the additional expansion of the nontradables
sector due to a real appreciation. One could come up with many more sto-
ries that produce the same results.
Using only the macroeconomic evidence to sustain the mechanism in
which there are credit constraints in the nontradables but not in the trad-
ables sector is not enough. The results from the authors’ microlevel data
could be used to show that it was actually the credit-constrained ﬁrms in
the nontradables sector that saw the greatest relaxation of their credit con-
straints after ﬁnancial liberalization. 
the mexican experience. Turning to the case of Mexico, the authors
argue that Mexico is a bumpy underperformer. This means both that Mex-
ico is a highly bumpy economy and that, even controlling for its bumpi-
ness, the country has grown less than it should have.
I think that when one looks at the scatterplots in the authors’ ﬁgure 5
and tries to imagine how a regression would ﬁt that set of data points, it is
clear that the error for Mexico in that regression should be relatively
small. Therefore the authors’ result showing that Mexico is growing more
slowly than it should might not be statistically signiﬁcant, given the large
standard errors that those regressions have.
Turning to the recession that the Mexican economy has experienced
since 2001, the authors argue that their theory, particularly its invocation
of bottlenecks in the nontradables sector, explains the negative growth.
However, the main driver of this recession has been the slowdown in the
U.S. manufacturing sector. Mexico today is basically another manufactur-
ing region within North America. And, as my ﬁgure 1 shows, the correla-
tion between manufacturing (or industrial) production in the United States
and that in Mexico is close to 0.9. Given that the U.S. industrial sector has
been the driver of the current recession and the sector that has suffered the
most, it is not surprising that the Mexican economy has suffered as well.
This suggests that the vector autoregression estimated in the paper may
not give an accurate explanation for this period.
In addition, the stagnation experienced in formal employment in Mex-
ico in the last three years suggests that there are no bottlenecks in the
economy (see my ﬁgure 2). Rather than the nontradables sector acting as
a bottleneck, holding back the tradables sector as the authors suggest, the
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Figure 1. Industrial Production in Mexico and the United States, 1997–2003a
Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics and U.S. Census Bureau.
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Figure 2. Formal Employment in Mexico, 1998–2003a
Source: Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social.
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slowdown in the tradables sector is affecting growth in the nontradables
sector. Tradables output turned down in 2001, before nontradables output,
and therefore the nontradables-to-tradables output ratio increased in that
year. This is difﬁcult to reconcile with the argument that it was the slow-
down in the nontradables sector that affected the tradables sector. It is
more likely that this slowdown in the tradables sector has generated a sig-
niﬁcant underemployment problem that has affected consumption, invest-
ment, and the development of the nontradables sector. In short, I think the
main story is the opposite of that presented in the paper.
A closer look at the Mexican recession suggests that it is an almost
exact copy of the recent recession in the United States. Private investment
and industrial production in Mexico fell in tandem with those in the
United States. What has been different is that the authorities in Mexico
lack the capability to follow effective countercyclical policies. 
Although, in Mexico, credit has not been as useful as it has in the
United States as a mechanism for smoothing the business cycle, credit to
the private sector has begun to grow once again, but from very low levels
(see my ﬁgure 3). The growth in credit was at ﬁrst largely for consump-
tion, but in 2002 credit to ﬁrms also started to increase. Therefore,
although the banking sector is starting to lend, it took too long for this to
happen, as the paper stresses.
What were the reasons behind this credit crunch? First of all, I agree
with the authors that the bank restructuring process was slow. However,
this comment should be put in perspective, by comparing the speed of
restructuring after Mexico’s banking crisis with that in other bank bailout
and restructuring processes in Latin America over the last twenty years. It
is hard to judge whether Mexico’s restructuring was unduly fast or unduly
slow if one lacks a benchmark.
A second point is that, throughout this period, banks were building up
capital. Eventually this process accelerated, as all remaining restrictions
on foreign capital coming into the domestic ﬁnancial industry were lifted
in 1998. Today several important mergers are taking place in the ﬁnancial
sector, and this is diverting attention from lending to the private sector. It
might also be the case that the recession began just as banks were ready to
restart their lending. Obviously, a situation in which private investment is
falling at an annual rate of 5 percent is not the best time to lend. The legal
problems that the paper mentions are another element that affected this
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2003
1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 104process. Therefore, one has to wait and see whether, as the economy and
investment start to pick up, banks once again start lending aggressively in
Mexico.
The ﬁnal question that stands out is why we do not see a market solu-
tion to the credit constraint problem in the nontradables sector. In such a
situation one would expect to see some kind of vertical integration, in
which large ﬁrms in the tradables sector incorporate their nontradable
goods suppliers into their corporate structure, so as to bypass the credit
problem. In the medium run, if this situation continues, one would tend
to see more vertical integration in countries with severe ﬁnancing
constraints. 
To sum up, this paper is a comprehensive empirical analysis of the
work that these authors have been developing over the last three or four
years relating ﬁnancial liberalization, crises, and growth. It presents sev-
eral new results, some of which prove some of the linkages that their the-
oretical work has suggested are important, whereas others will stimulate
further research on the topic. 
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Figure 3. Growth in Credit to the Private Sector by Use, 1998–2003













1790-01_Tornell.qxd  1/7/04  2:53 PM  Page 105General discussion: Aaron Tornell responded to some points in Alejan-
dro Werner’s comment. The paper recognized that developments in the
U.S. economy were important to Mexican exports, but it identiﬁed credit
effects leading to bottlenecks as an additional important factor in the most
recent period of recession. He noted that it was not appropriate to cite the
high correlation between levels of industrial production in the two coun-
tries as evidence that they explain almost everything about Mexican out-
put, because both series are nonstationary. He also observed that the
growth in consumption credit cited by Werner accounts for less than
5 percent of total credit in Mexico, whereas the other two credit compo-
nents ﬂuctuate around zero. 
Participants discussed the way ﬁnancial liberalization was modeled in
the paper. Susan Collins criticized the use of capital ﬂows, a de facto mea-
sure, as a proxy for ﬁnancial liberalization, a policy variable. She pointed
out that measures of policy and measures of actual ﬂows behave very dif-
ferently. Therefore inferring the effects of liberalization from a study
based on actual ﬂows could lead to misleading interpretations of the effect
of policy changes. Carmen Reinhart echoed Collins’s comments. She
added that de jure measures of ﬁnancial liberalization may be endoge-
nous, because countries usually introduce capital controls in times of
stress and liberalize when international and domestic conditions are
favorable.
The roles assigned to the tradables (T) and nontradables (N) sectors in
the authors’ model were also discussed. Ricardo Caballero argued that the
key role assigned to currency mismatches in squeezing the N-sector
through the impoverishment of the banking system may be overstated. He
suggested that “T-collateral” be thought of as something that allowed
some domestic ﬁrms direct access to international ﬁnancial markets, and
“N-collateral” as something that allowed the allocation of excess interna-
tional collateral to those domestic ﬁrms that lacked direct access. The
more fundamental problem is the collapse in T-collateral, rather than the
balance sheets of domestic banks. He noted that Chile, despite having a
well-developed ﬁnancial system, went into crisis when large ﬁrms could
not borrow abroad and turned instead to the domestic banks and nonbank
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, crowding out smaller borrowers. In Argentina it was the
government that squeezed out the private sector. But in both cases the rea-
sons for the contraction of credit to the domestic private sector were unre-
lated to any currency mismatch. 
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nontradables sectors is not straightforward, especially because major
changes have occurred in Mexican trade policy. To illustrate the difﬁcul-
ties, he cited the examples of some agricultural goods that are still effec-
tively nontraded, and of gas, which because of a policy decision by
Pemex (the state petroleum company) is not exported. Cooper added that
although the paper assumes the dependence of the tradables sector on the
nontradables sector, the opposite could occur as well, for example in the
case of transportation services, which depend importantly on tradable
goods.
Caballero addressed the issue of private sector overborrowing arising
from the likelihood of bailouts. He pointed out that a complete model
would need to address where the bailout money is expected to come from,
and that the implications and policy recommendations would depend
importantly on that question. If consumers are expected to pay for the
bailout, consumption should be falling rather than rising before the crisis,
which is not typically what happens. If the international community is
expected to provide the bailout resources, it may be optimal to overbor-
row, and attention should be directed to transferring the resources to the
private sector efﬁciently. Cooper added that if the money is expected to
come from the government, the demand for government funds to bail out
ﬁrms would compete with other needs and create a bottleneck in the ﬁscal
system, which a complete model should take into account.
Miguel Savastano suggested that certain institutional features of the
Mexican banking sector were important, and he argued that treating credit
availability as a homogeneous input to emerging markets production was
too strong an assumption. He noted that the role of banks differs widely
across Europe, the United States, Japan, Latin America, and Asia, and he
conjectured that the recovery of output with no recovery of credit in Mex-
ico should not be viewed as a major aberration. Such a pattern may well
be repeated in Argentina, for example. The present period in Mexico may
come to be seen as one in which other sources of credit developed. 
Carol Graham suggested an alternative mechanism to explain why
countries with deeper crises grow faster: Instead of credit expansion lead-
ing to growth and crises, it could be that countries with deeper crises
make more and deeper economic reforms. She suggested that the institu-
tional reforms pending in Mexico may be an important part of the story
there. 
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